On May 10, 1940, there were almost 3500 battle tanks available to combat units located along the front facing Germany. Here is a breakdown in actual numbers. The remainder of France's tank force were located in arsenals or in training schools.

----------

     French tanks were well armed, armored and automotively designed. After the Great war came a debate about the future of the tank in many nations. This debate fell into basically 2 schools of thought. Was the tank an infantry support weapon or was it a new form of weapon? The end of WW1 left the question wide open. Tanks were not advanced enough to be much more than infantry support weapons when the war ended and advancing technology caused thought and tactics to fall into the realm of the military dreamer. Tanks proponents and dreamers of what a future war would be like were usually ignored or abused in their home country while being admired by men in other nations. This proves what Jesus went through - you will never be a prophet in your home town. What would the next war be like? How will we make the next war bend to our dreams and planning? Old school officers are trained to be slow to accept change. They are taught to think things out carefully. After all, the military in every nation is the bulwark of national tradition. Tradition resists change. This occurs everywhere. Wartime leaders rarely are successful in peace as peacetime leaders are rarely successful in war. The politics of life dictate that. In war, everyone loves a decisive, "line in the sand" leader as they bring stability and reduce fear. In peace, people find this kind of person inflexible. A great example is Winston Churchill, loved in war, tossed out of office 3 weeks after VE day.
     The fall of France in 1940 came from some rather simple reasons. The first was motivation and leadership - German troops were simply more motivated and better lead. The second was tactics - some nations got the idea of tank warfare right (Germany) and others got it wrong (France). Those nations that followed the French system of tank deployment quickly learned to change tactics after the fall of Poland and France. Anyone who employed the French system can give thanks that Germany did not practice on them first. However, it should be noted that the German Blitzkrieg, though excellent in 1939, was a defective plan by 1942. The next logical step was the "all arms" approach practiced today. Massing tanks like Germany did would simply not work today any better than the French penny packet infantry support idea worked in 1939. Both systems were absolutely correct - when you add them together - you get "all arms". You can see this in 1944 after the allies invaded France. The allies did not possess better tanks or guns, but they did, by then, use an all arms approach.
     The Germans did not have more or better of anything in the form of equipment when they invaded France in 1940. France fell to the two factors of leadership and motivation. An excellent example of the same factors can been seen in the fall of Burma in 1942 to the Japanese. Another is the much maligned airplane - the Brewser Buffalo. In the hands of the British and Dutch in Burma, the plane was defeated at every encounter against the Japanese. This gave it a horrible reputation. HOWEVER in the hands of the Finns, it went on to become a plane of Aces! The American ace - Johnny Johnson - said it all when he said the difference between him and other not so successful pilots was that when he flew, it was with the thought of "I am going up to kill the enemy" others went up with the thought "I hope that I don't get killed today".
     In conclusion, it is easy to pick on the defeated. We can point fingers all day at items like the lack of communications in the French army HQ, or the inferiority of French anti tank guns and the like. But, the French did not have military morons in charge. They loved their country and were prepared to die for France. They simply did not have the right formula - motivation and tactics. If they had these, Germany would have been halted, or even more, France would have truly invaded Germany when she had the chance.

Katya Kuersteiner

Pascal Danjou

Tim Keennon

"Evolutionary"

Alexis Fritel

Juergen Kurz

Pete Lago

Michal Derela

John Wilson

Mike Gilbert

Dr. André Louis Maurois

Dr. Georg V. Rauch
Author of
Conflict in the Southern Cone

Ionica Fonosch

Chester A. Kojro

Ruud Staneke

Martin Eykholt

Etienne Le Chevalier

Last Update: Thursday, February 20, 2003