

Fall 2005
Bellamy 113
F 12:30-3:00 PM
<http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~him/teaching.htm>

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Office Hrs: TR 4:50-5:30 PM
(and whenever I am around)

CPO 5740 Comparative Political Economy

Course Objective

There are several broad areas of inquiry referred to as political economy. This course is intended as an introduction to two of them, positive macro-political economy and the micro-economics of politics. In the two-thirds of the semester, we will be focusing upon how certain political configurations (institutions, etc.) and events (elections, etc) systematically produce certain sorts of economic policies and upon how these configurations and events might condition the effects of the policy so made. In other words, political economy is taken primarily to mean the politics and economics of macro-economic policy-making. In the remainder of the semester, we will study how self-interested rational policy-makers make choices in a politicized environment, employing the utility-maximization theories and tools of microeconomics. The objective of this course is to analyze the interaction between politics and economics (or politicians and economists). The course is theoretical and empirical in orientation and attempts to integrate rather than separate the concerns of economics and politics.

Texts

Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. *Analytic Narratives*.
Powell, Jr., G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. Yale University Press.
Liphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six Countries*. Yale University Press.
Budge et al. 2001. *Mapping Policy Preferences*, Oxford University Press.

These books are paperbacks and available at the FSU bookstore.

We will also read unpublished book manuscript by McDonald and Budge as well as many journal articles and book chapters in this course.

Requirements

1. Participation (50% of course grade):

- (i) Seminar attendance, adequately prepared, is required.
- (ii) In each of the weeks two through fourteen, one of the students will be asked to chair the week's discussion. The number of times you will serve as chair will depend on the number of students in the class. Each week, the discussion chair will summarize the week's reading (for about an hour), and run the class discussion (after the break). I will be just one of the participants.

(iii) The week's discussion chair is required to submit a report about the week's reading (about 7-8 type-written pages) prior to the class meeting. In your report, you should first summarize the important findings and then evaluate the strengths and weaknesses (in both substance and methodology) and implications of the week's reading. This report is due 9 AM Thursday prior to the class and should be sent to me as an e-mail attachment. The report submitted late does not get the proper credit.

(vi) Each week, everyone in the class (except the week's discussion chair) is required to submit a brief critique (not a summary) of the week's reading (about 2 type-written pages) and three discussion topics based on your critique prior to the class meeting. Your critique should be sent as an e-mail attachment to me and the week's discussion chair by 9 AM Thursday. It is your responsibility to know your classmates' e-mail addresses. Again, the discussion topics submitted late do not get the credit.

(v) Besides submitting discussion topics, students are expected to actively participate in actual classroom discussion.

2. Research Paper (50% of course grade):

By week thirteen (and preferably much earlier), you must have an approved paper topic. I will reserve week fifteen for progress reports on work-to-date on your paper (see course schedule below for details of our activities on week fifteen). The research paper should be approached with the full intent of producing publishable-quality work. The assigned readings may be good places to begin looking for material for your research paper. Do keep in mind that it is a research paper. In a research paper, you set out your own original argument first and try to prove (or defend) it rather than just state facts or what other people have said. You are free to choose your method of analysis, be it empirical (i.e. data analysis, any type of technique is acceptable), formal (i.e. game theory, decision theory, coalition theory, etc), or case-study oriented. You must submit a completed paper by 5 PM, Wednesday, December 14.

COURSE SCHEDULE

Week 1 (September 2): Issues and Context

I will be out of town to attend the APSA meeting. No class. Read the syllabus carefully. Skim through the required books to get some idea about the course material. Read ahead as much as you can and try to develop some idea about your choice of presentation topic(s). As soon as you decide what topic and in which week you want to present, send me an e-mail about your choice(s). The assignment will be made on a first-come first-served basis. Try to get some idea about the concept of "the left-right ideology" commonly used in political science, since we will discuss how to measure it next week.

Week 2 (September 9): Measuring Left-Right Ideology: Party Ideology I

Castles, Francis G., and Peter Mair. 1984. "Left-Right Political Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments." *European Journal of Political Research* 12: 73-88.

Laver, Michael, and Ian Budge, eds. 1993. *Party Policy and Coalition Government in Western Europe*. London: Macmillan, ch.2.

Huber, John, and Ronald Inglehart. 1995. "Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies." *Party Politics* 1: 73-111.

Huber, John, and Matthew J. Gabel. 2000. "Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-

Right Positions from Party Manifestos Data." *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 94-103.

Weisberg, Herbert F., and Aiji Tanaka. 2001. "Change in the Spatial..." *Political Behavior* 23: 75-101.

Erikson, Robert, Michael MacKuen, and James Stimson. 2001. *The Macro Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch.7.

Laver, Michael, and John Garry. 2002. "Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts." *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 619-34.

Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry. 2003. "Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data." *American Journal of Political Science* 97: 311-331.

Week 3 (September 16): Measuring Left-Right Ideology: Party Ideology II

Budge et al. 2001. *Mapping Policy Preferences*, Oxford University Press, chs.1-7, 9.

Week 4 (September 23): Measuring Left-Right Ideology: Voters, Parliaments, and Governments; Explaining the Changes in the Left-Right Ideology

Huber, John. 1989. "Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring Ideology." *European Journal of Political Research* 17: 599-621.

Kim, HeeMin, and Richard C. Fording. 1998. "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 1946-1989." *European Journal of Political Research* 33: 73-97.

Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson. 2001. *The Macro Policy*. Cambridge University Press, ch.6.

Kim, HeeMin, and Richard C. Fording. 2002. "Government Partisanship in Western Democracies, 1945-1998." *European Journal of Political Research* 41: 165-184.

Kim, HeeMin, and Richard C. Fording. 2003. "Voter Ideology in Western Democracies: An Update." *European Journal of Political Research* 42: 95-105.

Castles, Francis G. 1990. "The Dynamics of Policy Change: What Happened to the English-Speaking Nations in the 1980s." *European Journal of Political Research* 18: 491-513.

Host, Viggo, and Martin Paldam. 1990. "An International Elements in the Vote?: A Comparative Study of 17 OECD Countries, 1948-1985." *European Journal of Political Research* 18: 221-239.

Durr, Robert. 1993. "What Moves Policy Sentiment?" *American Political Science Review* 87: 158-170.

Stevenson, Randolph T. "The Economy and Policy Mood: A Fundamental Dynamic of Democratic Politics?" *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 620-633.

Kim, HeeMin and Richard C. Fording. 2001 "Voter Ideology, the Economy, and the International Environment in Western Democracies, 1952-1989." *Political Behavior*.

Recommended:

Budge et al. 2001. *Mapping Policy Preferences*, Oxford University Press, ch.8.

Week 5 (September 30): Political Institutions and Representation

Lijphart, Arend. 1990. "The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85." *American Political Science Review* 84: 481-496.

Powell, Jr., G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. Yale University Press, chs.1-6

Monroe, Burt L. and Amanda G. Rose. 2002. "Electoral Systems and Unimagined Consequences: Partisan Effects of Districted Proportional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 67-89.

Powell, Jr., G. Bingham. 2004. "Political Representation in Comparative Politics."

Week 6 (October 7): Political Institutions and Performance I

Crepaz, Markus. 1996. "Constitutional Structures and Regime Performance in 18 Industrialized Democracies: A Test of Olson's Hypothesis." *European Journal of Political Research* 29: 87-104.

Anderson, Christopher J., and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems." *American Political Science Review* 91: 66-81.

Castles, Francis G. 1999. "Decentralization and the Post-War Political Economy." *European Journal of Political Research* 36: 27-53.

Tsebelis, George. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 93: 591-608.

Rogowski, Ronald, and Mark A. Kayser. 2002. "Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power." *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 526-539.

Liphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six Countries*. Yale University Press, chs.1-5.

Week 7 (October 14): Political Institutions and Performance II

Liphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six Countries*. Yale University Press, chs.6-17.

Week 8 (October 21): Political Institutions and Congruence I

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard I. Hofferbert, and Ian Budge. 1994. *Parties, Policies, and Democracy*. Boulder: Westview Press, chs. 1-3 and 14.

Huber and Powell. 1994. "Congruence between Citizens and Policymakers." *World Politics*

Powell, Jr., G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. Yale University Press, chs.7-10.

Week 9 (October 28): Political Institutions and Congruence II

Powell and Vanberg. 2001. "Election Laws, Disproportionality, and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy." *British Journal of Political Science*

McDonald, Michael, Silvia Mendes, and Ian Budge. 2004. "What Are Elections For? Conferring the Median Mandate." *British Journal of Political Science* 34: 1-26.

Powell, Jr., G. Bingham. 2004. "Election Laws and Representative Governments: Beyond Votes and Seats." *British Journal of Political Science*.

Author unknown. "Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between Citizens and Policymakers?"

Kim and Fording. 2005. APSA paper.

Budge and McDonald. Book manuscript, chs.1-4.

Week 10 (November 4): Political Institutions and Congruence III

Budge and McDonald. Book manuscript, chs.5-13.

Week 11 (November 11): Veteran's Day. No class.

Week 12 (November 18): Rational Choice Controversy

Frank, Robert H. 1990. "Rethinking Rational Choice" in Friedland and Robertson.
Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast. 1998. *Analytic Narratives*.
Granato, Jim, and Frank Scioli. 2004. "Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Significance of Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM)." *Perspectives on Politics* 2: 313-323.

Recommended:

Tsebelis, George. 1990. *Nested Games*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. 1994. *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*. Yale University Press.
Friedman, Jeffrey, ed. 1996. *The Rational Choice controversy*. Yale University Press.

Week 13 (November 25): Thanksgiving Break.

Week 14 (December 2): Rational Choice vs. Area Studies; Applications

Little, Daniel. 1991. "Rational-Choice Models and Asian Studies." *Journal of Asian Studies* 50:35-52.
Bates, Robert H. 1997. "Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy." *PS* 30: 166-170.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1997. "Perception vs. Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science." *PS* 30: 170-175.
Lustick, Ian S. 1997. "The Disciplines of Political Science & Studying the Culture of Rational choice as a Case in Point." *PS* 175-179.
Gerring, John. 2004. "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?" *American Political Science Review* 98: 341-354.
Geddes, Barbara. 1991. "A Game-Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 85: 371-92.
Przeworski, Adam. 1992. "The Games of Transition." in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp.105-152.
Brady, David, and JongRyn Mo. 1992. "Electoral Systems and Institutional Choice" *Comparative Political Studies* 24: 405-429.
Kim, HeeMin. 1997. "Rational Choice Theory and Third World Politics: A Case Study of the 1990 Party Merger in Korea." *Comparative Politics* 30: 83-100.
Crisp, Brian, and Rachael E. Ingall. 2002. "Institutional Engineering and the Nature of Representation: Mapping the Effects of Electoral Reform in Columbia." 46: 733-748.
Kim, HeeMin. "A Risky Game to Play..." unpublished manuscript.

Recommended reading:

Niou, Emerson M.S., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1992. "A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Republic of China's Emerging Electoral System." *International Political Science Review* 13:59-79.

Cheng, Tun-Jun, and Mihae Lim Tallian. 1995. "Bargaining Over Electoral Reform During the Democratic Transition" in HeeMin Kim and Woosang Kim, eds., *Rationality and Politics in the Korean Peninsula* (Michigan State University, 1995), pp.17-52.

Ramseyer, J. Mark., and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 1997. *Japan's Political Marketplace*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Colomer, Josep M. 2000. *Strategic Transitions: Game Theory and Democratization*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Week 15 (December 9): Students' Progress Reports on Research Paper

On December 9, each of you will be given time to present your preliminary research findings in the class. The length of your presentation will depend on the number of students in the class. Each of you will also serve as a discussant for one presentation by your fellow classmate. So, the format of the class on week 15 will be: a presentation by one of you about your preliminary paper, a discussion of the paper by another member of the class, followed by an open discussion by the whole class. Then we move on to the next preliminary paper. Your role as a discussant (i.e., whose paper you will discuss) will be assigned on week 14. You should make your preliminary paper available for all members of the class including me before the class for meaningful discussion of your paper. So, you should e-mail your preliminary paper (3-5 pages) to each of your classmates including me by 9 AM on Thursday, December 8. After week 15, you will have five days to revise your paper based on the comments you get from your discussant, the whole class, and myself before the final paper submission deadline, which is 5 PM, Wednesday, December 14.