

A Risky Game to Play: The Politics of the Impeachment Game in Korea

HeeMin Kim
Department of Political Science
Florida State University
hkim@fsu.edu

Abstract

A stunning political event happened in Korea in March 2004 as the National Assembly impeached President Roh Moo-hyun, only a year into his term as President. The opposition parties with over two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly decided to use their numerical strength only one month before the next National Assembly elections. Two major decisions resulting in the outcome included the President's refusal to apologize for the violation of election law and the actual vote of impeachment by the opposition on March 12, 2004. Why did President Roh refuse to accept the opposition's demand for an apology and take the risk of impeachment, knowing that the opposition had a sufficient number of votes? Also, why did the opposition proceed with impeaching the President at the risk of punishment by the electorate, with the National Assembly elections only a month away? These are puzzling questions, since neither side seemed to have acted in a rational fashion. In this paper, I employ the analytic narratives approach (Bates et al. 1998), specifically a Bayesian (incomplete information) game-theoretic model, along with rich historical details, to explain why the Presidential impeachment took place in the manner it did. In doing so, this research contributes to an existing theoretical debate about the usefulness of rational choice theory in analyzing particular real world situations.

Introduction

On March 12, 2004, a stunning political event happened in Korea as its National Assembly impeached President Roh Moo-hyun, only a year into his term as President. The opposition parties with over two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly decided to use their numerical strength only one month before the next National Assembly elections. As a result of the impeachment, the case was sent to the Constitutional Court for a final decision according to the Korean constitution. Roh's presidential powers were immediately suspended, and Prime Minister Koh Gun became acting head of state. The opposition's reason for the impeachment was the President's public expression of support for the governing Uri Party for the upcoming National Assembly elections (which oddly enough was a violation of election law in Korea; see historical background below) and his refusal to publicly apologize for his conduct as the opposition demanded (*Hankuk Ilbo*, Various dates, 2004).

As one would agree, this was almost a bizarre set of events. Why did President Roh refuse to accept the opposition's demand for an apology and take the risk of impeachment, knowing that the opposition had a sufficient number of votes? Also, why did the opposition go ahead and impeach the President for seemingly trivial reasons at the risk of punishment by the electorate, with the National Assembly elections only a month away? These are puzzling questions, since neither side seemed to have acted in a rational fashion. This situation is further complicated since neither side knew with certainty whether the Constitutional Court would uphold the impeachment and how the electorate would react to the impeachment vote. A game-theoretic model can be used to solve these puzzles, since plenty of strategic calculations must have been involved on the part of both the President and the opposition. Further, a Bayesian (incomplete information) game-theoretic model

seems appropriate since both the President and the opposition faced the uncertainties described above. This leads us to an existing theoretical debate about rational choice theory in social science.

The debate is about the usefulness of rational choice theory in analyzing particular real world situations. The rational choice school has been known for its ability to develop general theories. With its methodological sophistication, it has developed prominent theories with many testable hypotheses, but according to its critics, little attention was paid to the individual and real-world political events by this school. Critics point to the abstract and logical character of game theory, but do so in order to condemn it. The failures of rational choice theory, Green and Shapiro (1994) declare, are “rooted in the aspiration of rational choice theorists to come up with universal theories of politics.” The result, they argue, is a preoccupation with theory development, accompanied by a striking “paucity of empirical application” (1994, x). Research “becomes theory driven rather than problem driven”; its purpose is “to save or vindicate some variant of rational choice theory, rather than to account for... political phenomena” (1994, 6).

Although the amount of research was certainly not abundant, there have been some good efforts to explain the real world political events utilizing rational choice tools (see Popkin 1979 and Kim 1997 among others). Recently Bates et al. (1998) gave this attempt the new name of “analytic narratives.” According to them, “analytic narrative combines analytic tools that are commonly employed in economics and political science with the narrative form, which is more commonly employed in history....it is narrative; it pays close attention to stories, accounts, and context. It is analytic in that it extracts explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which facilitate both exposition and explanation.” It is “problem driven, not theory driven; it is motivated by a desire to account for particular events or outcomes. It is devoted to the exploration of a case, not to the elaboration of

theory. In these ways, it counters the charges raised by Green and Shapiro. Although informed by deductive reasoning, it seeks no universal laws of human behavior” (1998, 11).

In this paper, I employ the analytic narratives approach to explain why the Presidential impeachment took place when the choices made appear irrational to most observers of Korean politics. In the first section of this paper, I describe the historical events leading up to and including the impeachment vote in the Korean National Assembly in 2004. In the following section, I build a Bayesian game theoretic model of the impeachment situation in Korea. Next I describe the two political events following the impeachment, the National Assembly elections and the decision by the Constitutional Court, the sources of uncertainty at the time of impeachment decision. I then evaluate the decisions made by both the President and National Assembly opposition and conclude the paper.

Background Information

Presidential Election of 2002

The governing party candidate, Roh Moo-hyun, defeated opposition candidate, Lee Hoi-chang in the presidential election held in December 2002. Many aspects of Roh’s victory over Lee, however, made subsequent governing difficult. First, it was one of the closest contests in the history of Korea. Roh received 48.91% of the total votes cast, while Lee received 46.59% with the remaining 4.5% going to minor party candidates. This difference amounts to 570,000 votes out of over 24.5 million votes cast. This small margin of victory made it more difficult for the losing side to accept the election result (ala the U.S. presidential election in 2000).

Second, the election outcome was considered to be a stunning upset. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP) candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, had already run for the presidency against Kim

Dae-jung in 1997, which he narrowly lost. Since then, Lee had “managed” the Party with the primary goal of taking another crack at the presidency in 2002. A succession of well-timed events led to the nomination of Roh Moo-hyun, a relative lightweight even in his own party, as the governing party candidate. Prior to the scheduled presidential election in 2002, public opinion polls had consistently shown Roh Moo-hyun trailing Lee Hoi-chang (*Joongang Ilbo*, various dates, 2002). It was not until a few days before election day when the tide of public opinion began to turn. Roh’s come-from-behind win in a matter of a few days made it a bitter pill to swallow for the losing side.

Third, this was the first national-level election in the history of Korea in which generational differences played a critical role in the election outcome -- the old primarily supported Lee Hoi-chang, while the young preferred Roh Moo-hyun. This new generational cleavage can be traced back to several different roots. The first has to do with economic or the left-right ideological division. Lee Hoi-chang, with his nobleman’s image and conservative stands on various issues, were supported by those who were well-to-do and who preferred stability, many of them happening to belong to the old generation. On the other hand, Roh Moo-hyun, a high school graduate without a college education, became a human rights lawyer by passing a difficult bar exam. He was the epitome of the self-made man and a champion of the weak and the poor, an image that appealed to the young generation.

The year 2002 was also a period when many South Koreans went through a transformation in their beliefs about the desirable place of South Korea between the U.S.A. and North Korea. The acquittal in U.S. military court of two U.S. soldiers who caused the deaths of two Korean girls by accidentally running them over with a military vehicle enraged Korean citizens and led to countless candlelight vigils and violent demonstrations in front of the U.S. embassy throughout the year. The Bush administration’s tough stance against North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” also added fuel

to the debate over what North Korea was to South Koreans. Many Koreans believed that the Bush administration's North Korea policy not only undermined former President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine" policy (engagement policy), but unnecessarily heightened tensions in the Korean Peninsula, from which, if anybody, Koreans would suffer.

Under these circumstances, the older so-called 6-25 (the Korean War) generation was quite suspicious of the real intentions of North Korea and placed greater weight on maintaining the traditional military alliance with the U.S. Lee Hoi-chang had continuously stated his preferences for North Korean aid policy based on "reciprocity" and called for the cessation of all monetary aid to the North that could be subverted to funding its nuclear programs. Naturally Lee was a favorite among the older, established generations in South Korea. On the other hand, Roh Moo-hyun advocated continued cooperation with the North to prevent heightened tension in the Korean Peninsula, which could lead to a U.S.-North Korea clash. Further, he seemingly took quite a strong position toward the U.S. He indicated that under his presidency, he would establish an equal relationship between the U.S. and Korea. His seemingly independent position was extremely popular among the younger so-called post-6-25 (or post-Korean War) generation (*Joong-ang Ilbo* various dates, 2002).

(Table 1 about here)

Table 1 shows the split between the old and the young in the presidential election of 2002. As we can see, voters in their 20's and 30's overwhelmingly supported Roh Moo-hyun. On the other hand, voters in their 50's and above overwhelmingly voted for Lee Hoi-chang. Those in their 40's constitute some sort of boundary between the two contending generations.

In short, we can say that the presidential election of 2002 in Korea split the country into two (again, analogous to the U.S. presidential election of 2000), in which a progressive candidate supported by the younger generation scored a stunning come-from-behind win over the conservative

candidate supported by the old and well-to-do, after which the latter felt quite bitter and were not quite willing to accept the result of the election.

Events Leading up to the Impeachment Vote

Since the democratic opening in 1987, most Korean presidents have had to face divided governments with majority oppositions in the National Assembly. Roh Tae-woo (not to be confused with Roh Moo-hyun), who was elected in 1987, began with the governing Democratic Justice Party with a majority of seats in the Assembly, which shrank to a minority party in the following elections. Roh's solution was the three-party merger to create a dominant governing party in 1990. Subsequently, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, when they faced strong opposition after their elections as presidents, had to rely on quite undemocratic means, such as utilizing the Supreme Prosecutor's Office to tame the opposition assembly members and to induce party switching among them.

Roh Moo-hyun, when elected President, not only faced a majority opposition party in the GNP but a significant portion of his own party which had not supported him at the time of the nomination contest. With or without signals from the Blue House, the presidential mansion in Korea, those within the governing New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP) who were friendly to President Roh defected from it to establish a new governing party. The result was the founding of the so-called Uri ("Our") Party in 2003.

(Table 2 about here)

Table 2 shows the seat distributions in the National Assembly in Korea. The middle column shows the seat distribution among political parties after the National Assembly elections in 2000. The far right column shows the seat distribution as of January 2004 after the founding of the Uri

Party. As we can see, even after the establishment of the de-facto governing Uri Party, the Roh government's base of governing was quite weak within the National Assembly. Further, Roh supporters' defection from the NMDP in the end turned it into a hostile opposition since its remaining members felt betrayed by the Roh supporters.

Throughout 2003 and early 2004, Korean society was swept by revelations of many wrongdoings on the part of politicians and big business involving illegal donation/collection and spending of campaign contributions at the time of the 2002 presidential election. With skyrocketing public anger, in January 2004, 13 National Assemblymen were arrested and charged with various corruption practices involving mishandling of money. The Supreme Prosecutor's Office indicated that more National Assemblypersons were under investigation. With most of those under arrest or investigation being GNP and NMDP members, they felt that they were unfairly targeted by the Supreme Prosecutor's Office, which were, at least in theory, part of the executive branch under the head of state, the President.

In a press conference in early 2004, President Roh stated that he hoped the governing Uri Party would acquire as many seats as possible in the upcoming National Assembly elections scheduled in April. This remark enraged the opposition, since under the Korean election law, public officials are prohibited from openly supporting a particular political party (although the law itself sounds pretty unrealistic). The National Election Commission formally warned the President against further similar remarks. Now the opposition demanded a public apology by the President for the remark. Otherwise, according to the opposition, they would push for the impeachment of President Roh as the GNP and the NMDP combined had more than two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly necessary to pass the impeachment motion. According to the opposition, there were three reasons for potential impeachment of President Roh: (i) violation of the election law through his

public support of the Uri Party; (ii) financial wrongdoings of Roh's relatives and close supporters; and (iii) economic mismanagement resulting in a near crisis situation during the first year of the Roh regime.

In a nationally televised press interview in March, President Roh refused to apologize in relation to the violation of election law. This further enraged the opposition assemblypersons, and many who had been reluctant to vote for the impeachment were now leaning toward voting for it. On March 12, the historic impeachment vote was taken. The governing Uri Party assemblypersons, lacking the necessary one-third votes to block the impeachment, occupied the assembly president's podium to prevent the vote itself, but were dragged out of the floor by assembly security. In a subsequent vote cast by the opposition only, 193 out of 195 voted for the impeachment, exceeding the necessary two-thirds majority (181) by 12 votes. As a result, the President was impeached. As a final step, the case was sent to the Constitutional Court for a final decision.¹ Roh's presidential powers were immediately suspended, and Prime Minister Koh Gun became the acting head of state (*Hankuk Ilbo*, Various dates, 2004).

The Impeachment Game

Why did President Roh refuse to accept the opposition's demand for an apology and take the risk of impeachment, knowing the opposition had a sufficient number of votes? Also, why did the opposition go ahead and impeach the President at the risk of punishment by the electorate, with the National Assembly elections only a month away? These are puzzling questions, since neither side seemed to have acted in a rational fashion. This situation is further complicated since neither side

¹ The Constitutional Court can refuse to consider the case, uphold, or overturn the impeachment.

knew with certainty whether the Constitutional Court would uphold or overturn the impeachment and how the electorate would react to the impeachment vote. Bayesian game theory offers tools capable of analyzing situations where at least one player is uncertain about part of the extensive form (see Gibbons 1992 and Morrow 1994). In this section, I attempt to answer the puzzling questions posed above by building a Bayesian game-theoretic model in which both the President and the opposition face the uncertainties described above.

(Figure 1 about here)

This situation is depicted in extensive form in Figure 1. In this game, Nature goes first and determines the type of electorate between the one that punishes the opposition for the impeachment and one that does not, a decision that is not known to the President or the opposition. Further the two players are not certain either about whether the Constitutional Court will uphold it or not, once the impeachment vote passes in the National Assembly. Then, the President decides whether to publicly apologize (A) or not ($\sim A$) as the opposition demanded. Finally, the opposition decides whether to impeach the President (I) or not ($\sim I$). Given the amount of uncertainty involved in this game regarding the types of the electorate and the Constitutional Court, both President and the opposition face complicated decision-making calculations, which, in turn, makes our analysis difficult. Close observation, however, allows us to simplify the extensive form in Figure 1.

First, if the President apologizes, the opposition gets what they demanded, namely having him admit he violated the election law and causing him to lose face. Then the opposition does not have an incentive to impeach the President at this point. Indeed it should avoid doing so, since such an act will definitely create the impression of its being unreasonable. Then we can say that the opposition's "dominant action" is not to impeach once the President apologizes. So, once the President apologizes, the opposition does not have any real choice to make, and we will declare that

the game is over. This will allow us to prune the extensive form in Figure 1. This also means that when Nature chooses between “punish” and “not” in the beginning of the game, it chooses between the electorate that punishes and one that does not *when the opposition impeaches after the President decides not to apologize.*

Second, given the outcome of surveys of both governing party and opposition members by media sources, both the President (or the governing party) and the opposition seemed to have formed subjective probabilities about the Constitutional Court’s decision at the time they actually made their choices. Right after the impeachment vote, a poll was taken among the assembly persons about the prospect of the impeachment being upheld by the Constitutional Court. 60.7 percent of the GNP assemblypersons expected it, while the number was 50 percent among the NMDP members. Given the assembly seat distribution between the two parties, the percentage of the opposition members who expected the Constitutional Court upholding the impeachment amounted to roughly 59 %. It is interesting to note that none of the Uri Party members expected it to happen (*Yonhap Tongshin Network* March 17, 2004). Given these known subjective probabilities, I will use these numbers when I try to solve the game in Figure 1. The two points I made above reduces the extensive form in Figure 1 to the one in Figure 2.

(Figure 2 about here)

In this reduced game tree, once the President publicly apologizes, the outcome is the status quo – no impeachment-- under the opposition terms (SQ_O). If the President does not apologize and the opposition does not impeach, then the outcome is the status quo under the President’s terms (SQ_P). If the President does not apologize and the opposition impeaches him, then the outcome is a probability distribution over the scenarios in which the Constitutional Court upholds the impeachment (I_O) and does not (I_P). As stated earlier, both the President and the opposition had

subjective assessment of the value of q . Of course, we still need to assess the impact of the two types of the electorate, the one that punishes the opposition for the impeachment and the one that does not.

Now let us look at this impeachment game from President Roh's point of view. The possible outcomes are: SQ_O when he apologizes; SQ_P when he does not apologize and the opposition does not impeach him; and $qI_O+(1-q)I_P$ when he does not apologize and the opposition impeaches him. Although, in principle, the President's utility is not affected by Nature's choice between "Punish" and "Not" (since it is the opposition that is punished if the electorate chooses to), it is indirectly affected by Nature's choice, since if it chooses "punish," the governing party is likely to gain seats in the Assembly, given the zero-sum nature of the Assembly elections. From the survey of the National Assemblypersons cited above and assuming that the President shared the same information with the governing party members, we can assume that the President's subjective probability of the Constitutional Court upholding the impeachment, say $q' = 0$. Then $U_P[qI_O+(1-q)I_P] = U_P(I_P)$ at the time he made the decision. So, for the President, the utilities of three possible outcomes are $U_P(SQ_O)$, $U_P(SQ_P)$, and $U_P(I_P)$. Obviously, $U_P(SQ_P) > U_P(SQ_O)$, since the President would rather not apologize and admit inappropriate behavior if he could avoid impeachment. The magnitude of $U_P(I_P)$ is what interests us most, the utility to the President when the opposition impeaches him, which is overturned by the Constitutional Court. More discussion about this possibility follows below.

The situation is more complicated for the opposition. Unlike the President, the opposition must consider Nature's choice between "Punish" and "Not." Based on the survey of the National Assembly persons cited above, we will assume that the opposition's subjective probability of the Constitutional Court upholding the impeachment, say $q'' = .59$. Then $U_O[qI_O+(1-q)I_P] = U_O[.59I_O$

+ .41I_P]. For the opposition, obviously $U_O(SQ_O) > U_O(SQ_P)$. The magnitude of $U_O[.59I_O + .41I_P]$ would depend on whether the opposition thinks the electorate will punish the impeachment vote or not. Obviously, it would be the worst possible outcome if the Constitutional Court decides to overturn the impeachment, and the electorate chooses to punish the opposition.

Aftermath of the Impeachment

To the opposition's amazement, the reactions to the impeachment were a near universal condemnation. Virtually all NGOs, labor organizations, student groups, scholars, and lawyers' associations denounced the vote and declared civil disobedience. Massive demonstrations ensued (*Hankuk Ilbo*, Various dates, 2004).

(Table 3 about here)

The National Assembly elections were held on April 15, as scheduled. The outcome of the National Assembly elections, along with the seat distribution just before the elections, is shown in Table 3. The elections resulted in the new Assembly whose composition was quite different from the previous one. For our purposes, we cannot overlook the demise of the opposition, especially of the NMDP, and the political victory of the governing Uri Party. The GNP also lost a significant proportion of seats considering the increase in the total number of seats in the Assembly to 299. This was the first time in 19 years that the governing party acquired a simple majority of seats (which requires 150 in a 299-seat assembly) in the National Assembly in Korea.

Surveys of the electorate indicate that the impeachment was the overwhelming criterion for their vote choice. In the 2004 National Assembly elections, politics clearly was not "local." Voters paid little attention to the candidates, but looked primarily at their party labels (*Joongang Ilbo*,

various dates, 2004). Obviously the electorate did not approve of the impeachment vote by the opposition and punished it as such.²

On May 12, 2004, the nine-member Constitutional Court announced its decision, by a majority vote, to overturn the impeachment, reinstating President Roh to office.³ It ruled that, although some minor election law violations actually occurred, they were not serious enough to warrant a presidential impeachment. This verdict was widely accepted by the Korean public. The new political lease on life, coupled with control of the National Assembly, is expected to allow Roh Moo-hyun to pursue a more activist agenda (*CNN.com*, May 13, 2004, *New York Times*, May 14, 2004).

Assessment⁴

Now I will assess the choices made by the President and the opposition in March of 2004. As we already know, President Roh Moo-hyun chose not to apologize (~A) and the opposition chose to impeach (I). As I stated above, $U_P(SQ_P) > U_P(SQ_O)$ and $U_P[qI_O+(1-q)I_P] = U_P(I_P)$ since the governing party and the President *believed* that there was zero chance of the Constitutional Court upholding the impeachment. I_P is the outcome when the opposition impeaches him, which is overturned by the Constitutional Court. Yes, the President's authority might be undermined if he should be impeached even if it is overturned by the Constitutional Court. But was it necessarily a

² Surveys of the electorate throughout the period following the impeachment vote in March leading up to the National Assembly elections in April indicate that the GNP would have lost a lot more seats had the elections been held right after the impeachment of President Roh. The mismanagement of the campaign effort on the part of the Uri Party leaders and the fresh image of the new leader of the GNP (a daughter of former President Park Chung-hee) made the contest between the two parties much closer than it would have been otherwise (*Joongang Ilbo*, various dates, 2004).

³ It did not reveal the vote split among its members.

terrible outcome compared to SQ_O , the outcome in which he publicly acknowledges that he has violated law and apologize for it? In this case, not only is his authority damaged, but there would be zero chance of helping the governing Uri Party in the upcoming elections. In the case of I_P , at least the President may be able to *induce* sympathy on the part of the electorate and the resulting punishment of the opposition. Then, when the President chose between A and $\sim A$ in March, 2004, the choice was in fact between (i) certain public humiliation with little chance of enhancing governability (SQ_O) and (ii) some sort of lottery between complete vindication (SQ_P) and the impeachment overturned by the Constitutional Court, which may actually enhance the power of the governing party through the weakening of the opposition. In short, choosing confrontation ($\sim A$, choosing not to apologize) may not have looked so bad, given the choices he had.

Now let us move over to the opposition's choice. Once the President decided not to apologize, the opposition was left with going ahead and impeaching him or backing away from its initial threat of impeachment. As we found out above, the opposition *believed* that there was nearly 60% chance of the Constitutional Court upholding the impeachment. Then the opposition's choice was between a good chance of driving President Roh out of the office, probably its most preferred outcome, and a complete vindication of the President. Even so, the opposition's choice of impeachment makes sense only if it *believed* that the chance of the electorate's adverse reaction (punishment) was not that high. Although I do not have information to directly support this claim, given the split of society between the governing party and the opposition supporters following the presidential election of 2002 and subsequent political developments, the opposition probably had every reason to believe that at least its core constituents, nearly half of the population, would stay with it, which apparently didn't happen.

⁴ The verbal description in this section is based on more technical equilibrium analysis, which I do not show here. Please contact the author at xxxx@xxxx for a copy of the equilibrium solutions.

In sum, despite the seemingly erratic behavior on both sides, the President and the opposition played the impeachment game in a rational fashion, *given their preferences, the choices they had, and the information they had (their beliefs) about the state of nature* (Ordeshook 1986 and Kim 1997 among others). The difference was in the accuracy of information they held. Looking at subsequent developments, President Roh and the governing Uri Party had accurate information or beliefs about the Constitutional Court's decision and the nature of the electorate. It was the opposition, which had completely misread the potential reactions of both the Constitutional Court and the electorate. And that made a critical difference in the final outcome of the impeachment game in Korea.

Conclusion

On March 12, 2004, a stunning political event happened in Korea as its National Assembly impeached President Roh Moo-hyun only a year into his term as President. The opposition parties with over two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly decided to use their numerical strength only one month before the next National Assembly elections. It is troublesome since the impeachment of President Roh appears to have been the result of a set of irrational decisions. The investigation of actual events above reveal the preferences, choices, and the information about the nature of the political situation the President and the opposition held at the time they made their decisions. Based on this information and utilizing a game-theoretic model, I show that the choices made by both sides are indeed not that surprising or irrational.

As stated in the first section of this paper, there is an on-going debate about the usefulness of rational choice theory in analyzing particular real world events. Critics argue that it is preoccupied with theory development, accompanied by a striking "paucity of empirical application" (Green and

Shapiro 1994, x). In this paper, I employ what is now named as the analytic narratives approach, which combines analytic tools with the narrative form. It is “problem driven, not theory driven; it is motivated by a desire to account for particular events or outcomes. It is devoted to the exploration of a case, not to the elaboration of theory.” (Bates et al. 1998, 11). This paper adds another case to the list of real world events, which have been successfully explained using rational choice approach.

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**Table 1. Percentage of Votes Won (by Candidates and Age Groups),
Presidential Election, 2002**

Age Group	Lee Hoi-chang (Grand National Party)	Roh Moo-hyun (New Millennium Democratic Party)	Others
20's	31.7	62.1	6.2
30's	33.9	59.3	6.8
40's	48.7	47.4	3.9
50's +	58.3	39.8	1.9

Table 2. Seat Distribution in the National Assembly in Korea

Political Parties	After the 16 th General Election in 2000	As of January 2004
Grand National Party	133	148
New Millennium Democratic Party	115	60
United Liberal Democrats	17	10
Uri Party	N/A	47
Others	8	6
Total	273	271*


*A death and a conviction reduced the number of assemblypersons by two.

Table 3. Seat Distribution in the National Assembly in Korea

Political Parties	As of January 2004	After the 17 th General Election in 2004
Grand National Party	148	121
New Millennium Democratic Party	60	9
United Liberal Democrats	10	4
Uri Party	47	152
Democratic Labor Party	0	10
Others	6	3
Total	271	299*

*The new electoral law enacted just before the elections increased the number of seats in the National Assembly to 299.


Figure 1. The Impeachment Game



*The specific outcomes are omitted for lack of space.

**The dotted lines are information sets showing the amount of information available to each player. The fact that all four decision nodes of the President's are connected with a dotted line means he does not have complete information about the Nature's choices. The opposition's two information sets show that it does not know the Nature's choices with certainty, but does know the President's choice.

Figure 2. The Impeachment Game: Reduced Form



A Biographical Note

HeeMin Kim is a professor of political science at Florida State University. He received a Ph.D. in political science from Washington University in St. Louis in 1990. His research interests include electoral systems, voting behavior, and institutional change in Western democracies and Northeast Asia. He has been president of the Association of Korean Political Studies (2001-2003), a Korea Foundation fellow (2002), and a visiting fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (1999). He is a recipient of the Best Publication Award in Korean Political Studies (1995, for *Rationality and Politics in the Korean Peninsula*) and multiple National Science Foundation grants. He can be reached at hkim@fsu.edu, and his website address is <http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~hkim>