Question Two

Chomsky defines an E-language, as one which lists all possible or actual words and sounds that are a part of the language (RJS, 16). Similarly, some, such as David Lewis, think that enumerating all possible sentences along with their meanings would best characterize a language (RJS, 16). The vastness of a language, in terms of its various sounds, words: verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs, prepositions etc., and all the possible combinations of those elements, makes the task of determining all the possible sentences of a language quite difficult, if not impossible. Indeed, a spoken language is in flux, with new words being coined and archaic words being shelved. The “E” in E-language can stand for either externalized or extensional language. In either case, an E-language is an abstract and artificial construct which characterizes language by all its various components. By externalized, Chomsky means that an E-language does not refer to an internal structure in the human mind but something external. Those of the behaviorist tradition would define a language by a lengthy account of its expressed words or behaviors. Extension refers to compiling a list of all the elements in a language and then grouping them into various sets, so for instance, verbs may be in one set and adjectives in another. The appeal of using sets is that if one knows all the members of a set, then one truly understands or knows all that can possibly be known about a given set. If an E-language could adequately represent a language, then it could be said that it is possible to know all there is to know about a given language. An E-language system seems more useful in mathematics and logic since systems such as these lend themselves to being grouped into sets. For example, one way to understand odd numbers is to make a list of them. A set established in arithmetic is more stable and useful than a set of something which is frequently changing, either expanding or contracting, such as a language. A set which lists even numbers is not likely to ever change, but a set for something as dynamic as the verbs in English changes quite frequently. For instance “to text” someone or “to google” something are two relatively new verbs which have become part of English vernacular.

An I-language differs greatly from an E-language. The “I” of I-language can stand for internalized. By this, Chomsky refers to an internal “language acquisition device” namely the brain (RJS, 5). In considering how a language is learned, Chomsky looked to the state of an infant, who has no knowledge of language but soon begins to acquire it. Unlike written language which must be taught formally and explicitly, acquiring one’s native language is done naturally and largely internally, after exposure to language. The mind is what allows this remarkable process to occur (RJS, 5 and 18). An I-Language then, is the state of the mind/brain of a fluent speaker (RJS, 18). The “I” in I-Language may also refer to intension. In this sense, an intension is a rule which determines whether or not something belongs to a particular set. For his I-Language account, Chomsky along with Jespersen, seems to favor a mind that is able to discover definite rules of a language (grammar) that are essential to one’s ability to speak a given language fluently (RJS,18). The knowledge of the rules of grammar which one develops naturally allows one to formulate unique and original expressions. Chomsky even notes that grammar also relates to a state of the mind (RJS, 19).

Chomsky is the leading figure who pushed to redirect the study of language from an E-language to an I-language account. An I-Language account has no need for the technical and abstract E-Language systems; rather it takes the common sense approach. He observes that the I-language seems to be the best explanation of the phenomena of naturally attaining language proficiency of one’s native tongue (RJS, 22). Empirical evidence based on observations of and experiences with native speakers indicates that an I-Language account is more probable. A fluent speaker of a language does not memorize thousands of possible sentences to use, but learns the rules which govern his native language and uses these to form his own original, impromptu sentences. Chomsky’s “language acquisition device,” which he conjectures is part of one’s brain, explains why children all around the world are able to acquire a first language (RJS, 5). Children do not seem to learn language by being taught a categorical system, but they seem to make sense of language on their own (RJS, 25). Indeed with an I-Language a child is able to sort through all the various sounds and expressions, and classify all of them appropriately (RJS, 21). The differences in speech between two native speakers of the same language are more satisfactorily explained by the “I-language” account. It allows for more subjectivity, since it focuses on a particular person’s state of brain. Each person’s language is different, if only slightly, from everyone else’s and this may not be expected from a regimented, standard system as espoused by the “E-language” exposition. Perhaps most appealing, an I-Language account also allows a physical object, the brain, to be studied as opposed to artificial systems of an E-language.

Question Three

Frege relies on Leibniz’s law, which states formally that x = y if one variable can be substituted for the other while the meaning remains the same, to define what it means for two things to be identical (RJS, 45). In Frege’s terms, two different senses (descriptions) can point to one and the same referent (object) (RJS, 46). Take for instance the statement: the rising sun is the setting sun. Both present accurate descriptions of the Sun. The phrase: the setting sun is the rising sun, merely substitutes one word for the other and still the meaning is not affected. This sentence also refers to the Sun. To make this even clearer, consider the sentence: the rising sun is the largest star in our solar system. Likewise, the statement: the setting sun is the largest star in our solar system is also true and has the same referent. Sentences of this sort fulfill Leibniz’s law.

Not all statements in a language conform to Leibniz’s law. Sentences that contain intentional context pose a problem for Leibniz’s law. An example is a statement with indirect quotations, which express belief, sentiment, perception and knowledge. These statements appear only as subordinate clauses, which cannot stand on their own and are often introduced by the word “that” (RJS, 52). For instance, Michael thinks that Johannes de Silentio wrote Fear and Trembling. It does not proceed from this that Michael also thinks that Soren Kierkegaard wrote Fear and Trembling. If Michael does not know that Johannes de Silentio and Soren Kierkegaard refer to the same author, he could deny that Soren Kierkegaard wrote Fear and Trembling. Even though Johannes de Silentio is merely one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, in this case they cannot be used interchangeably (RJS, 49). Whether or not the two can be used interchangeably depends on Michael’s state of mind. Statements such as these introduce subjectivity into language, which is precisely what Frege sought to eradicate. The ideas a person has about something tend to be “saturated with feeling” and that has no place in a formal, logical language (RJS, 47). The subordinate clauses represent only a portion of the thought that is behind the entire sentence (RJS, 52).

Take another example: Octavian is Augustus. The statement, Andy doubts that Octavian was the first Roman emperor, expresses a thought (thought 1). Likewise, the sentence, Andy doubts that Augustus was the first Roman emperor, is a different thought (thought 2). Thought 2 does not follow from thought 1; nor does thought 1 follow from thought 2 because Andy may not know that Octavian is indeed Augustus. In these sentences, the man Octavian/Augustus himself is not the referent, but rather Andy’s idea of him is. Frege mentions that when it comes to intentional context, statements do not have their normal sense and referent (RJS, 47). Instead of pointing to an actual referent, such as the example in the first paragraph where the referent is clearly the Sun, statements with indirect quotation point only to a thought. They tell only of the indirect reference, someone’s particular idea. For example, Andy doubts that Octavian is the first Roman emperor, refers to a particular idea which Andy holds about Octavian (RJS, 52). This particular idea may also be known as the customary sense, Andy does not refer to the actual Octavian; he is referring to his own description of Octavian (RJS, 47). Andy’s description of Octavian may be that he is the adopted son of Julius Caesar. Similarly, Andy doubts that Augustus was the first Roman emperor, refers to his subjective description of Augustus. He may define Augustus as the husband of Livia. In this case, Andy’s use of “Octavian” refers indirectly to something different than what his use “Augustus” indirectly refers to. Since two terms are only equal if they have the same indirect reference, these two names for the first Roman emperor are not interchangeable (RJS, 53). Another example of intentional context is an adverbial clause which expresses purpose (RJS, 53). Take this example: Jim studied in order to pass the test, refers only to a thought. It simply reflects what Jim thought he had to do in order to pass a test.

When thoughts are the referents of sentences, truth value does not apply to them (RJS, 52). Unlike the example from the first paragraph which not only conforms to Leibniz’s law, but also functions as a truth value, statements with intentional context are not functions of truth value (RJS, 52). Michael thinks that Johannes de Silentio wrote Fear and Trembling does not reflect the truth or falsity of the statement: Johannes de Silentio wrote Fear and Trembling.

Sentences which include direct quotation also fail to conform to Leibniz’s law. Essentially, direct quotations fall within the category of intentional context. Similar to indirect quotations which express what someone thinks or believes, direct quotations state the thoughts and opinions of others verbatim. The sentence, Horace famously wrote “seize the day,” shall serve as an example. This is what Frege calls a “signs of signs” (RJS, 47). My words simply point to Horace’s words “seize the day.” A sentence which quotes the words of another first indicates the reported speech and then the thought behind it (RJS, 47). Sentences with quotes seem to contain two thoughts; one thought is the thought solely behind the quoted material, and then there is the thought of the entire sentence. Quotation marks can also be used to draw attention to the words themselves. For instance, “carpere” means “to pluck” in Latin. This is another example of “signs of signs,” with words just indicating other words (RJS, 47). In the case of directly quoted material, the quotes do not have their normal reference (RJS, 47). “Seize the day” does not just refer to a line of poetry, but refers to a thought. Likewise “carpere” does not just refer to its translated definition in English.