Berry, William. “Utility Regulation in the States: The Policy Effects of Professionalism and Salience to the Consumer.” American Journal of Political Science, 23 (May 1979): 263-77.

This study explores the determinants of state regulatory commission policy in regards to electric utilities. We employ "ratios of rate differentiation" as indicators of the relative burden falling on "have-not" consumers of electricity in a state's population. Two variables are found to be useful in explaining variation in rate structure: the salience of regulation to the "have-not" consumer and the level of professionalism of the state commission. Commissions in states where regulation is more salient to the "have-nots" are found to be more protective of the interests of the "have-nots" in that state. Professionalism mediates this relationship between salience and commission policy. On the basis of this evidence, some tentative conclusions about the validity of the "capture theory" are drawn.