Berry, William. “An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation: The Case of State Public Utility Commissions.” American Journal of Political Science, 28 (August 1984): 524-58.

This article presents a theory of regulation based on the assessment of the objectives of regulatory commission personnel and the resources at their disposal. The theory generates several interrelated hypotheses, which are tested using comparative empirical analysis of the factors determining state regulatory commission policy concerning electric rates. The results prove consistent with recent studies challenging key assumptions of the once-dominant "capture" theory of regulation. An explanation of the policies of state regulatory commissions is found to require consideration of two objectives of commissioners: (1) implementing the dominant "nonpecuniary" guide for policy choice among regulatory officials: the principle that the major determinant of regulated utility rates should be the cost of providing service; and (2) the goal of "survival," i.e., remaining in office and maintaining sufficient order and political support to function effectively in the regulatory process. But the analysis suggests that commission professionalism and objectives. Furthermore, there is evidence that the presence at regulatory proceedings of an intervenor representing the interests of consumers and the extent to which these proceedings are open to the public influence regulatory policy by affecting the incentives of commission personnel and widening the information resources at a commission's disposal.