

Table 6

Z-scores for GEDS/IPI Sequences for Brazil, 1983-89

	Second Event			
First Event	Dom. Conf.	Int. Conf.	Dom. Coop.	Int. Coop.
Dom. Conf.	6.26	-2.08	2.06	-3.17
Int. Conf.	-1.25	4.36	-1.61	-1.80
Dom. Coop.	2.56	0.04	4.26	-4.09
Int. Coop.	-4.10	-2.35	-2.47	5.73

Table 5
GEDS/IPI Sequences for Brazil, 1983-89

First Event	Second Event				Total
	Dom. Conf.	Int. Conf.	Dom. Coop.	Int. Coop.	
Dom. Conf.	13 (0.35)	2 (0.05)	7 (0.19)	15 (0.41)	37 (1.0)
Int. Conf.	4 (0.05)	29 (0.35)	4 (0.05)	47 (0.56)	84 (1.0)
Dom. Coop.	8 (0.18)	8 (0.18)	12 (0.27)	16 (0.36)	44 (1.0)
Int. Coop.	13 (0.04)	45 (0.15)	21 (0.07)	223 (0.74)	302 (1.0)
Total	38	84	44	301	467

$$\chi^2 = 98.91$$

Table 4
IPI Sequences for Brazil, 1983-89

First Event	Second Event		
	Conflict	Cooperation	Total
Conflict	17 (0.46)	20 (0.54)	37 (1.0)
Cooperation	20 (0.45)	24 (0.55)	44 (1.0)
Total	37	44	81

$$\chi^2 = 0.00$$

Table 3
GEDS Sequences for Brazil, 1983-89

First Event	Second Event		
	Conflict	Cooperation	Total
Conflict	29 (0.35)	55 (0.65)	84 (1.0)
Cooperation	55 (0.18)	246 (0.82)	301 (1.0)
Total	84	301	385

$$\chi^2 = 10.17$$

Table 2 (continued): The IPI Coding Schemes

The Cooperation Events

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1. Mildly positive statements (verbal or printed) about other parties, their representatives, proposals, or activities. No action promised.
 2. Strongly positive statements (verbal or printed) about other parties, their representatives, proposals, or activities. Implied or literal promises of action.
 3. Minor cooperative actions.
 4. Agreements to attempt to settle protracted conflict, or relaxing minor restrictions.
 5. Relaxing government sanctions, or actions designed to mitigate protracted conflict.
 6. Reforms; relaxing major restrictions; truces.
 7. Substantial agreements.
 8. Conflict termination: the parties agree to terminate the internal war, but do not create new institutions for managing the underlying conflict.
 9. Conflict settlement: the parties agree to terminate the internal war and create new institutions for managing the underlying conflict.
 10. Conflict Resolution.
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Source: Leeds et al. (1995). Each of the above categories has several sub-categories that were used for coding. For more information, please visit the IPI World Wide Web site at:

<http://wizard.ucr.edu/~wm/ipi/ipi.html>

Table 2: The IPI Coding Schemes

The Conflict Events

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1. Mildly negative statements (verbal or printed) about other parties, their representatives, proposals, or activities. No action threatened or implied.
 2. Strongly negative statements representing implicit or explicit threats.
 3. Non-violent protests, demonstrations, or strikes with political intent. Minor restrictions on political and economic participation. Legal actions protesting leadership or policies.
 4. Minor political violence and more significant restrictions on political and economic participation. Legal actions by elites undermining governance.
 5. General restrictions on political and economic participation, and political violence. Legal actions ending tenure of ruling group. Illegal attempts to restrict rival power.
 6. Illegal attempts at ending tenure of ruling group or extra-legal violent activities.
 7. Extensive political violence.
 8. Changing the structure of government or very high levels of political violence.
 9. Societal upheaval.
 10. Civil war.
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Source: Leeds et al. (1995). Each of the above categories has several sub-categories that were used for coding. For more information, please visit the IPI World Wide Web site at:

<http://wizard.ucr.edu/~wm/ipi/ipi.html>

Table 1: The GEDS Coding Scheme

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1. Voluntary unification into one nation.
 2. Major strategic alliance (regional or international).
 3. Military economic or strategic support.
 4. Non-military economic, technological or industrial agreement.
 5. Cultural or scientific agreements or support (non-strategic)
 6. Official verbal support of goals, values, or regime.
 7. Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions—mild verbal support.
 8. Neutral or non-significant acts for inter-nation situation.
 9. Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction.
 10. Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction.
 11. Diplomatic-economic hostile actions.
 12. Political-military hostile actions.
 13. Small scale military acts.
 14. Limited war acts.
 15. Extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic costs.
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Source: Azar (1993).

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account of the behavior of these actors. Further, there are in fact several variants of the diversionary and predatory hypotheses. For example, while many diversionary arguments expect civil conflict will produce international hostility, Morgan and Bickers (1992) suggest that intra-elite conflict behavior will produce diversionary crises. Tying this to the first point, then, we cannot adequately test the Morgan and Bickers hypothesis using only data on the state's conflict behavior. The IPI project produces data that can be aggregated across different actors thus making it possible to test hypotheses like Morgan and Bicker's. Finally, it would prove useful to use these analyses as a building block to multi-variate analyses that enable one to control for other factors (a common variable in the literature that ought to be controlled is economic performance). Dixon (1987, 1988) uses logistic regression to conduct just such multi-variate analyses. Lastly, Brazil exhibited a high ratio of international to domestic conflict behavior. Chile, by contrast, exhibits a low ratio of international to domestic conflict behavior. Other countries are undoubtedly more balanced. Thus, it is important to examine additional cases to learn whether the trends observed are associated with the relative frequencies of the two types of events. Future analyses will probe these relationships.

occurs *less* frequently than expected. It thus fails to provide support for the hypothesis that states sometimes attempt to divert domestic conflict by engaging in international conflict behavior.

Table 6 About Here

The fact that I have only analyzed the behavior of the Brazilian state (as opposed to dissidents and other states in the international system) prohibits me from further probing the diversionary hypothesis and exploring other hypotheses such as the predatory hypothesis. In addition, it would be useful to focus on higher order sequences. For example, in Brazil did any of the 29 ‘international conflict, international conflict’ sequences follow either of the ‘domestic conflict, international conflict’ sequences? If so, that would lend some credence to the diversionary hypothesis whereas a failure to find that conflict within the state leads to sequences of international conflict behavior would mitigate such a conclusion. These and other analyses are warranted.

4 Conclusion

By way of conclusion I focus on additional analyses I plan to conduct to further flesh-out the analyses reported here. The biggest shortcoming, in my view, is that the study simply focuses on state behavior. Dissidents and other states in the international system should be expected to influence the state’s conflictual behavior (Moore 1995). Thus, it is quite plausible that the findings reported here will be overturned by future analyses that take

a sequence that is directly relevant to the diversionary hypothesis? Not surprisingly, the most likely outcome is international cooperation (40% of the cases) followed closely by an additional act of conflict toward society (35% of the cases) and then cooperation toward society (19% of the cases). Thus, fully 94% of the cases of state conflict toward Brazilian society are followed by an event that cannot be described as diversionary. In 6% of the cases following state conflict toward society the Brazilian state next engaged in conflictual behavior toward a state in the international system. Thus, diversionary behavior was rather uncommon in Brazil during the 1980s.

Yet, while uncommon, was diversionary behavior a sequence that occurred more frequently than one would have expected given the number of international conflict events in the data? The z-scores for each of the sequences, which can be used to assess this question, are reported in Table 6. Though I am only interested in the diversionary sequence, it is interesting to note that 12 of the 16 z-scores are greater than the $|1.96|$ threshold required to reject the null-hypothesis (with α set to .05).⁶ The -2.08 z-score for the ‘domestic-conflict, international-conflict’ sequence enables us to contend that this sequence occurred less frequently than one would anticipate given the number of ‘international conflict’ events in the data set. Put differently, not only is this sequence uncommon, but it

⁶Because there were comparatively few IPI cases in the data the sequences where an IPI event was the second in the sequence did not produce normally distributed errors, thus calling into question the interpretation of those z-scores. However, that problem did not crop-up in the sequences where a GEDS event was the second in the sequence (i.e., the diversionary sequence).

(4) are ($\chi^2 = 0$). That is, the sequences of international events portrayed in the GEDS table can be treated as meaningful: the conditional frequencies in that table can be treated as useful expectations about future sequences. However, the conditional frequencies that can be produced from the IPI table should not be treated as useful expectations of future sequential patterns: we cannot reject the null- hypothesis.⁵

Tables 3-5 About Here

Having established that international conflict behavior by Brazil in the 1980s was dependent upon its past behavior, we can now explore whether studying the joint GEDS/IPI data suggests that the sequences described in Table 5 are independent of one another. The χ^2 value of 99 allows us to reject the null-hypothesis with substantial confidence. Again, the pre-dominance of cooperative international events is apparent (276 of the 433 events were cooperative international events). Further, international cooperation by Brazil continues to be followed by another international cooperative event: this pattern was observed in 79% of the cases in the GEDS series and continues to be observed in 74% of the cases in the joint GEDS/IPI series. Similarly, international conflict events are followed by international cooperation events 53% of the time in the joint GEDS/IPI series compared with 60% of the time in the GEDS series. That said, I turn my attention to the diversionary hypothesis.

What happens following conflict by the state toward Brazilian society,

⁵The same results emerged when using the other data sets described above where the events were not combined into dichotomous variables. I report these tables because they are much easier to present and discuss.

sequence was observed in the data). The percentages reported below the frequency counts are generally interpreted as observed conditional probabilities. I am interested in two statistical significance tests. The first, χ^2 , can be used to determine whether I should reject the null-hypothesis that the order (or sequence) of events is random (Bakeman and Gottman 1986: 130-33). The familiar χ^2 statistic is thus used in a conventional way: it assesses whether the patterns found in the table as a whole can be taken to represent well the population from which they have been drawn. The second, a z-score, can be used to examine individual cells within the tables. Since I am particularly interested in the diversionary hypothesis in this study, the z-score is a useful statistic: it can be used to confront the null-hypothesis that a particular sequence does not occur in the data more frequently than expected given the observed frequency of the second event in the sequence in data set (Bakeman and Gottman 1986:133-35, 155-58).

Tables 3-5 report the observed frequencies and percentages of the GEDS, IPI, and joint GEDS/IPI series using the dichotomous cooperation/conflict coding. The tables suggest a number of observations. First, there are far more international (GEDS) events in Brazil during the 1980s than domestic (IPI) events. Second, the international events are skewed heavily toward cooperation whereas the domestic events are more evenly distributed between cooperation and conflict. Most important of all, given the present interest in the diversionary hypothesis, the specific transitions reported in the GEDS table (3) suggest that the sequences are not distributed randomly ($\chi^2 = 10$), but the the sequences in the IPI table

Both the GEDS and IPI data were coded by human coders using Reuters news reports that were provided to our project by John Davies.

To prepare them for analysis the data were sorted by date (i.e., day, month, year) and read into the SDIS software package described in Bakeman and Quera (1995). SDIS prepares the data for analysis using the GSEQ package also described in Bakeman and Quera (1995). Because the IPI data in particular have a large number of event types, I decided to collapse the event types. I thus conducted two analyses on each set of data: one where the IPI scores were collapsed along their 10 point scales (thus producing a maximum possibility of 20 distinct event types); and another set of analyses where both the GEDS and IPI events were collapsed into cooperative or conflictual events.⁴

3.2 Results

The basic strategy behind the analyses was to first examine the GEDS data in isolation; the IPI data in isolation; and then study both domestic and international events in combination. The first task was to produce a square contingency table where each type of event transition was identified. The frequencies and row percentages are reported in such tables below.

The frequency scores indicate the number of times the row event was followed by the column event (i.e., the number of times the ‘row, column’

prevented us from getting the ASCII data back out of the coded files for the years 1990-94.

⁴Neutral events in the GEDS data (i.e., those assigned a score of 8) were included as cooperative events. I also examined the data using them as a separate type of event, and doing so did not change the results.

powers covering the years 1979-1994.

The discussion in this section is divided into two parts. First I describe the GEDS and IPI data and the data transformations that were performed to prepare the data for analysis. Then I report the results of the analyses.

3.1 Data

The GEDS data employ the COPDAB coding scheme which is described in Table 1. The COPDAB scheme has 15 points on the events scale with cooperative events being scored between 1 and 7 and conflictual events being scored between 9 and 15. In correlation-based analyses researchers need to convert these ordinal scales to an interval scale, and Azar (1993) has proposed a weighting scheme for doing so. However, the tests conducted in this study only require ordinal data, so the weights were not used.

Table 1 About Here

The domestic events data come from the IPI project (Leeds et al. 1995). The IPI data are coded using the coding scheme described in Table 2. Events are classified into a 10 point cooperation scale and a 10 point conflict scale. Events are further sub-classified into types. As with the GEDS data, weighting schemes were not employed to transform the ordinal data into interval data.

Table 2 About Here

This study uses the GEDS and IPI data from Brazil during the 1980s.³

³We have coded data through 1994, but a software problem at the GEDS project has

more directly at the notion of temporal causality.

The majority of statistical sequential techniques are concerned with the conditional probability of a given sequence being observed. As such, the analysis is based primarily on the examination of contingency tables and the analysis of observed frequencies, odds ratios, and familiar statistics like χ^2 and Yules-Q. In the remainder of this paper I describe the data used and the results obtained from testing the diversionary hypothesis concerning the domestic–international conflict nexus using sequential analysis.

3 Some Brazilian Evidence

To test the hypotheses requires data on conflict events within and between states. The Global Events Data Set (GEDS) project directed by John Davies at the University of Maryland is updating Edward E. Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) project for the 1990s. David R. Davis (Emory University) and I are directing the Intranational Political Interactions (IPI) project which uses a coding scheme modeled loosely after COPDAB's international events scheme to produce events data for conflict within states. As part of the project we are also using the GEDS scheme to produce international conflict events data for our cases during the 1980s. This study uses the GEDS and IPI data that we have collected for Brazil (1983-89). We will eventually have data for over 15 middle

(Bakeman and Quera 1995).²

The idea driving the development of these methods is substantive: many theories of social behavior suggest hypotheses about the sequences of events that we can expect to observe. When we are interested in the interaction of two or more actors, our theoretical arguments will quite likely produce some type of sequential expectation (Bakeman and Gottman 1986, Gottman and Roy 1990). Markov analysis was useful for testing whether certain ordered transitions occurred in a dataset more frequently than one would expect by chance. However, “the question most researchers have, far more specific than these questions of order, concern whether or not *specific* transition frequencies from an antecedent to a consequent state are different than one would expect if the two states were independent” (Gottman and Roy 1990:13, emphasis original). It is precisely this sort of question that is raised by the hypotheses described at the beginning of this section. Do states divert domestic conflict to the international system or are these two types of conflict behavior independent? If we use temporally aggregated data, we can simply conclude that the events did or did not co-occur within or across arbitrarily specified chunks of time. Using sequential techniques we can explore whether specific sets of sequences are observed in the data more frequently than we would expect, thus getting

²Other statistical discussions can be found in Wetherill and Glazebrook (1986), and Ghosh and Sen (1991). In addition, Heise (1989), Abbott (1992), and Abell (1993) provide useful discussions of different approaches to sequential analysis as it is developing in sociology. In political science, Schrodtt (1991, Schrodtt et al. 1996) has done some pioneering work using a sequential analysis approach.

thus, the sequential patterns contained within them. Yet, if one wishes to use conventional time-series statistical techniques—and these techniques are the lingua franca of systematic empirical inquiry in political science—then one must aggregate: these techniques require observations over fixed observational units (Dixon 1988:241). Freeman (1989) has demonstrated that when one aggregates observations from a single data set over different units of time, one finds different relationships among the variables in the data. Thus, following Dixon (1987, 1988) I suggest that it is useful to abandon conventional statistical methods that require one to aggregate observations in favor of lag sequential methods that do not impose that restriction on the data.

Psychologists and Sociologists have shown a great deal of interest in statistical techniques that were first developed for the study of sequences in the 1950s. These techniques grew out of Markov analysis which was developed to study transitions in systems from one state to another. Wilkenfeld (1968, 1974) uses Markov analysis in his studies of the domestic–international conflict nexus, though his observations were aggregated into annual units. Since the 1950s, however, a number of improvements in sequential analysis have been developed, and the psychologists Roger Bakeman and John Gottman have produced a useful trilogy of books that provide a research design overview (Bakeman and Gottman 1986), a statistical introduction (Gottman and Roy 1990), and a software package that can be used to conduct many of these analyses

when we use conventional time-series statistical techniques to study temporally aggregated data they provide us with information about average trends within our data; they are not capable of providing us with information about sequences of events. Put differently, if our theories posited that quarterly or annual units of domestic conflict behavior are *generally associated* with levels of international conflict behavior, then the designs in studies by Ostrom and Job (1986), Davis and Ward (1990), James and Oneal (1991), and Morgan and Bickers (1992) would be appropriate. Further, if our theories suggested that, in any given (set of) year(s), countries that experienced high levels of domestic conflict would also experience high levels of international conflict, then the research designs in studies by Rummel (1966), Tanter (1966) and Ross (1995) would be appropriate. But note that since both designs aggregate behavior across a given unit of time it becomes impossible for the design to distinguish between the two hypotheses discussed above: regardless of whether the domestic events preceded the international events (or vice versa) prior to being aggregated (and in most data sets it is almost certainly a mix of both), if positive conflict scores are recorded in a given observation unit (i.e., month, quarter or year) then the researcher will find a positive correlation. Yet, the ‘true’ relationship has been distorted by the temporal aggregation process.

The villain in this story, then, is the temporal aggregation of events: the aggregation of events over a uniform time metric distorts the data and,

cedure, and Freeman (1989) provides a more general discussion.

become involved in external conflict. The identification of an external enemy which threatens the continued existence of the state will encourage the domestic population to put aside their differences with the regime and instead direct their efforts at preserving the state from external forces. This hypothesis can usefully be labelled the diversionary hypothesis.

A second major hypothesis supposes that domestic instability in one nation inspires other nations to become involved in conflict with the strife torn nation. Other nations, sensing the internal weakness caused by domestic strife, originate conflict in an effort to enhance their power vis-à-vis the weakened regime or in support of a dissident group. This hypothesis can usefully be labelled the predatory state hypothesis.

These hypotheses have been tested using both cross-sectional and time-series designs coupled with conventional statistical techniques. The results have been contradictory and, thus, inconclusive (see Zinnes 1976, Stohl 1980, Levy 1989, and Starr 1994). Both hypotheses suggest that we should be able to identify patterned sequences of behavior: conflict within the state followed by conflict sent by the state to a rival state, or conflict within the state followed by conflict sent by a rival state to the state. Yet, cross-sectional research designs are incapable of providing us with tests of sequential behavior. Time series designs can provide such information, but scholars employing these designs aggregate their data into uniform chunks of time, thus arbitrarily lumping together certain events and separating others, and then examining the correlations between the chunks.¹ Further,

¹Dixon (1988) provides a useful discussion of this weaknesses of this aggregations pro-

1 Introduction

Scholars have long believed that conflict between states is influenced by conflict within states, and vice versa. However, there is little agreement among scholars about the specific linkages (i.e., their types, functional form, etc.). This study is a preliminary analysis that is part of a larger project in which I am engaged with David R. Davis. In the project we seek to contribute to the debate over the existence of such a nexus by examining domestic and international conflict for over 15 members of the developing world over the last 15 years, in order to determine the presence and nature of the linkage between the two areas. In this study I make an argument for employing sequential analysis to do so and discuss the preliminary results from studying the sequence of events in Brazil during the 1980s.

2 Sequential Analysis

The central argument in this paper concerns research design. In brief, I contend that most systematic empirical inquiries into the linkages between domestic and international conflict behavior use suboptimal research designs. Put differently, there is a substantial gap between the designs and the theoretical argument in many studies. To explain this charge, I begin with a brief review of two of the theoretical arguments one finds in the literature.

One major, long-standing hypothesis posits that political regimes governing states in the midst of internal conflict will attempt to create or

Abstract

This study makes a case for using sequential analysis to test hypotheses about the relationship between domestic and international conflict. Using events data from Brazil during the 1980s that were collected by the Global Events Data Set (GEDS) and Intranational Political Interactions (IPI) projects, I report the results of some preliminary sequential analyses. The results fail to provide support for what is generally referred to as the diversionary hypothesis of international conflict behavior (i.e., states sometimes attempt to divert attention from domestic trouble by engaging in conflict behavior with an international rival).

Domestic–International Conflict Sequences: Some Evidence from Brazil*

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August 13, 1996

* Prepared for delivery at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The San Francisco Hilton and Towers, August 29 - September 1, 1996. Copyright © by the American Political Science Association. This project is supported, in part, by funding from the National Science Foundation (SBR-9423762) and the Academic Senate of the University of California, Riverside.