| Students Working on their PhD | Students with their PhD | |
| Andreas Beger | Daniel W. Hill, Jr. (2012) | |
| Jillienne Haglund | Daniel Milton (2012) | Christine Mele | Patrick Armshaw (2011) |
| Sunhee Park | Jeffrey R. Weber (2010) | |
| Courtenay R. Conrad (2010) | ||
| Robert L. Parrillo (2009) | ||
| Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt (2009) | ||
| Joseph K. Young (2008) | ||
| Kürşad Turan (2005) | ||
| Andrew G. Long (2004) | ||
| Stephen M. Shellman (2003) | ||
| John A. Tures (2000) | ||
| Ronny Lindström (1996) | ||
| Click links above for details |
The three projects in this dissertation examine aspects of violence that are not traditionally studied in cross-national conflict research, with an eye toward developing knowledge and methods that are useful to policymakers. One project addresses the relationship between troop levels, force characteristics, strategy, and the dynamics of violence during the occupation of Iraq. Using event and geospatial data with multilevel Bayesian statistical methods, the goal of the project is to add to our knowledge about what makes counterinsurgency effective or ineffective. Another project examines the relationship between measures of ethno-nationalist diversity and violent event data at a sub-national level (Bosnia) using geospatial data and GIS methods. The final project uses existing rational choice theories on why states tolerate the costs of war to generate statistical forecasting models of how deadly interstate wars will be, and evaluates their performance in and out of sample.
Why would a government respond to a provocative transnational or domestic terror attack with a counter-terror military strike if this means the terrorist group will benefit due to increased mobilization? To answer that question this dissertation examines the impact of terrorist group behavior on mobilization and mobilization's impact on counter-terrorism decisions. Employing formal modeling, descriptive case studies, and statistical analyses it conducts inquiry on three issues. First is the role of uncertainty regarding the terrorist's resource level and the impact this uncertainty plays on the decision to allocate resources to military actions or club goods for the terrorist and counter-terrorism or public goods for the government in an attempt to win the population. Second is the role domestic politics plays for the targeted government as it selects between defensive and offensive strategies. Third, the dissertation combines the first two analyses, extends the time horizon, and teases out the implications of this new model.
Existing studies of civil war termination have exclusively focused on the factors that lead warring groups to begin negotiations and the outcomes of those negotiations, leaving unanswered an important question about warring groups' behavior at the bargaining table. Cases such as Sierra Leone indicate that groups make unexpected offers, thus raising a puzzle that motivates this project. Why would a stronger group ever make a smaller offer to itself, and why would a weaker group ever make a larger offer to itself than would be expected according to each group's relative power? And why do groups engaging in sequential bargaining change their bargaining behavior at different points in time? Park develops a general game theoretic bargaining model with a reneging option from which she draws a series of empirical implications concerning civil war termination bargaining. She then tests the hypotheses produced by the model using both large-N statistical analysis (1989-2008) and an in-depth case study of bargaining attempts during the Sierra Leone civil war from 1991 to 2002.
I am also serving as a committee member on the following students' dissertations: