

Action-Reaction or Rational Expectations?

RECIPROCITY AND THE DOMESTIC-INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT NEXUS DURING THE "RHODESIA PROBLEM"

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In this article, the author makes a case for expanding our focus from national-attributed studies of intranational conflict toward strategic behavior studies of intranational conflict. One payoff of such a move is that it enables us to specify a linkage between the strategic behavior of both domestic and international actors and thus address the often theorized, but rarely established, intranational-international conflict nexus. Further, the author takes a synthetic approach to the recent debate between action-reaction and rational expectations models of international conflict behavior and derives hypotheses concerning the behavior of both domestic and international parties to an armed intranational conflict. The hypotheses are then tested in a time-series case study design using the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean case for the period from 1957 to 1979. The results demonstrate that there existed an intranational-international conflict nexus in this case and highlight the utility of adopting a strategic behavior approach to studying armed intranational conflict.

This study is concerned with three issues: (1) modeling armed intranational conflicts, (2) the nexus between intranational and international conflict behavior, and (3) conflict abatement in armed intranational conflicts. News coverage of events in Rwanda, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia serve to remind us of the terrible toll armed intranational conflicts (i.e., civil warfare, guerrilla warfare, revolution, etc.) inflict on societies. In addition to the

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enormous death toll these conflicts generate, hundreds of millions of people are displaced and the economies are severely disrupted, thus contributing to the suffering. Given the consequences these conflicts produce, it is incumbent on social scientists to provide a better understanding of these conflicts so that we may put policymakers in a better position to minimize them and, thereby, improve the human condition. Yet relatively little research is aimed at such understanding. Further, the work that does exist is generally descriptive with respect to using evidence to test the theoretical frameworks that have been proposed. As a consequence, we have generated little systematic knowledge that can be used to answer some alarmingly simple questions: "Is the conflict getting better or worse?" and "When will the conflict end?"

By posing these questions I do not mean to suggest that social scientists seek to create a crystal ball with which to predict the future. Yet these are the most compelling questions asked by those whose lives are caught up in these conflicts. And unless we take these questions seriously, we will never move toward answering them. The key to addressing such questions is to recognize that they are questions about process; questions about the interaction of at least two actors. Thus, if we are to begin to address questions such as these, we must begin to do work that seeks to study conflicts as processes. This article presents one direction by which we can do so.

A related matter concerns the nexus between intranational and international conflict behavior. A series of studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s sought to empirically establish what linkages exist between these two spheres of action (for reviews, see Zinnes 1976; Stohl 1980; Levy 1989; Starr 1994). A variety of hypothesized relationships have been put forward and continue to garner interest, but the results from the first generation of statistical analyses were, at best, disappointing. The findings are largely negative and the few positive findings have not been corroborated using other data sets, samples, or designs. As a consequence, those who review the literature generally find themselves noting a paradox between the robust theoretical support for the presence of some kind of a nexus and the dearth of robust evidence of any kind of a nexus. This study takes a new tack to resolve that paradox and presents evidence to support the purported linkage.

The study is organized in the following manner. First, I develop the contention that a shift from aggregate models of intranational conflict toward strategic behavior models is useful, and then argue that doing so will enable us to locate a nexus between intranational and international conflict. Then, I review the reciprocity versus rational expectations debate concerning international conflict and rivalry, and use that work to develop several hypotheses about conflict patterns within and between the domestic and international spheres during an armed intranational conflict. In a third section, I briefly

review the Zimbabwe (or Rhodesian) case, and then develop actor-specific hypotheses regarding that case. In the fourth section, the data and method are reviewed, and the results are presented in a fifth section. I conclude the article by returning to the issues noted above: (1) modeling armed intranational conflicts, (2) the nexus between intranational and international conflicts, and (3) conflict abatement in armed intranational conflicts.

NATIONAL-ATTRIBUTE VS. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR MODELS OF INTRANATIONAL CONFLICT

The nexus between intranational and international conflict will be best illuminated by a focus on the strategic behavior of the parties involved. The reason is simple: I contend that the parties to these conflicts—both the domestic and international actors—pay attention to the behavior of the other parties when formulating their own strategic plans. Hence my main critique of the first-generation studies is that they are "national-attribute" rather than "strategic behavior" models. In this section, I first develop this critique by focusing on the study of intranational conflict, and then tease out the implications for the first generation of nexus studies.

Although scholars have focused a great deal of attention on the causes of political violence, internal war, revolutions, and so on, that work has typically focused the explanation on the attributes of the socio-economic-political environment in which these conflicts occur. As a consequence, the literature—especially the statistical modeling literature—has developed a significant lacuna with respect to the *behavior* of these groups and, more important, of the *interaction* of the behavior of the groups involved. Writing in 1978, David Snyder noted:

Most empirical analyses of collective violence—including the alternatives proposed here—primarily attempt to explain *how much* violence will characterize groups, nations and the like. These analyses generally (even necessarily) specify some "outcome" variable (frequency or magnitude of violence) in terms of prior characteristics of groups, areas and the like. (p. 524, emphasis in original)

Seven years later Charles Tilly (1985a, 527) echoed Snyder, suggesting that studies of intranational conflict "generally concern a population, or set of populations, considered to be at risk to action." Elsewhere, Tilly (1985b, 1) has argued that "since collective action is dynamic, and since its outcomes depend very strongly on the course of interaction, static models that simply match behavior to group characteristics or outcome to group behavior repre-

sent the entire process poorly." Like Snyder and Tilly, I am interested in modeling conflict processes. In other words, I am interested in better understanding the evolution of conflicts and the impact of the interactions of the actors on future events. It turns out that a growing literature proposing process models of intranational conflict has developed in the past eight years.¹ Yet this theoretical work has not been matched by empirical work to test those models. One major reason for the gap between the theoretical and empirical work is the dearth of data with which one can test those arguments. This is particularly problematic because we cannot assess the utility of the arguments proposed in the literature unless we test them. Put simply, one of the major roadblocks to advancing the theoretical work, and thereby the development of better theory, is the paucity of data with which one can test that theory.²

To move toward studying conflicts as processes requires that we model them with respect to time because these conflicts unfold over time. In addition, this means that we must test these arguments and theories using time-series data derived from individual cases. This is not to suggest that theories about the impact of the characteristics of groups and environments on the magnitude and intensity of conflict are unimportant, nor that cross-national studies of these relationships are meaningless. Quite the contrary: attribute theories and cross-national studies are useful for understanding general patterns of conflict, but they are incapable of addressing conflict as a process because they are essentially static "input-output" or "stimulus-response" type models, not dynamic models of interaction. These models tell us little about conflict as a process that evolves between two or more social actors. Put differently, although attribute studies give us useful information about general patterns of the relationship among various social attributes and behavior and certain correlates of conflict, they are moot when confronted with the following types of questions: "Given what has taken place in this conflict, what is likely to happen next?" "What are the prospects for a peaceful termination of this conflict?" and "What kind of an impact will a given third-party initiative have on the conflict?" These are all questions in which the evolution of the conflict with respect to time is important. Further, the questions push us toward studying the present as a function of the past and present interactions (i.e., behavior as opposed to attributes) of the actors involved. The national-attribute approach does not intend to address these

1. For example, see Lichbach (1987), Intriligator and Brito (1988), Blalock (1989), Simon (1989), Tsebelis and Sprague (1989), Brito and Intriligator (1990), Gupta (1990), Chong (1991), and Hoover and Kowalewski (1992). Studies by Salert and Sprague (1980) and Allan and Stahel (1983) are precursors to the present increase in this kind of modeling. For a recent review, see Lichbach (1993).

2. Of the studies noted in note 1, only the Allan and Stahel and Gupta studies make an effort to test systematically the ideas with evidence.

issues, nor is it capable of doing so. Thus we need to develop theory (and data) capable of addressing "process" as well as "attributes" questions.

What ramifications does this discussion have for the first generation of nexus studies? Unlike the intranational conflict literature, these studies focused primarily on conflict behavior within the nation-state (e.g., Rummel 1963; Wilkenfeld 1968; Hazelwood 1975; Davis and Ward 1990). However, with two exceptions (Stohl 1976 and Rasler 1986), they fail to distinguish among actors in the intranational arena. Stated simply, they aggregate conflict behavior within a given nation-state and treat it as an attribute of the domestic environment. Hence nation-states that experience substantial state repression and minimal oppositional violence can, in some studies, be indistinguishable from nation-states where violence is generated equally by both the state and dissident groups. More important, in these first-generation studies it is impossible to distinguish state behavior from dissident behavior (again, excepting Stohl and Rasler). One of the major reasons for this is that the data sets that have been created to study intranational conflict fail to make these distinctions usefully (for a discussion, see Moore and Lindström 1994). My claim, then, is that students of the nexus have failed to find a nexus because they have sought to find a nexus between the aggregate levels of conflict in a given nation-state and that nation-state's international conflict behavior when they should have been trying to find linkages between the conflict behavior of actors within the nation-state and the conflict behavior of actors outside the nation-state. The alternative approach is developed below.

RECIPROCITY VS. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS IN CONFLICT BEHAVIOR

Two different ideas have defined a recent debate in the study of international behavior: reciprocity and rational expectations. Reciprocity, the supposition that the behavior of one actor is conditioned by the behavior of other actors in a given social system (i.e., actors reciprocate one another's behavior), has stimulated enormous interest throughout the social sciences. In the field of international relations, the reciprocity notion has found its most prominent expression in three interrelated arenas: (1) the arms-race literature spawned by the work of Lewis Richardson (1960), (2) game-theoretic representations of state behavior (especially Anatol Rapoport's tit-for-tat strategy), and (3) the research that uses events data to search for patterns of reciprocity in the relations among nations (e.g., Richardson, Kegley, and Agnew 1981; Ward 1982; Dixon 1986; Goldstein and Freeman 1990, 1991; Greffinius 1990; Rajmaira and Ward 1990; Goldstein 1991; Ward and Rajmaira 1992;

Van Wyk and Radloff 1993a, 1993b). With the exception of Van Wyk and Radloff (1993a)—who include subnational actors in their analysis—these scholars limit their studies of reciprocity to the behavior of states in the international system. However, there is no reason to believe that subnational actors do not also reciprocate one another's behavior. Thus, following Tilly (1985a), who suggests that students of intranational conflict look to students of international conflict for interactive models, I begin the search for a domestic-international conflict nexus by considering the reciprocity argument.

How do scholars define reciprocity? Sandberg (1978, 1) argues that underlying the notion is "the assumption that there is communication of a pertinent type between the various parties and that 'reactions' tend to be reciprocated." Richardson, Kegley, and Agnew (1981) distinguish reciprocity from symmetry, noting that a "quantitative equivalence" is not required to establish affective content interaction. Keohane (1986, 8) argues that reciprocity has two distinctive elements—contingency and equivalence—and defines the concept as "exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for bad." In this study, reciprocity is defined as symmetric (i.e., contingent and roughly equivalent) interaction among two or more parties where each party's action is responsive to the action of the other(s). The task then is to specify a model that is capable of testing for the presence of reciprocity in the relations of parties to an intranational conflict.

To establish that there is reciprocity requires that we (1) assume that the parties abandon reciprocity from time to time and introduce initiatives in an attempt to elicit a response from their adversary and (2) specify what else drives behavior. The assumption regarding initiatives is important because it prevents the model from predicting that conflicts spiral endlessly up or down, or are static (i.e., two actors merely reciprocate one another's behavior and are stuck at a given level of interaction). Thus policy initiatives (i.e., departures from established behavior) are conceptually treated as exogenous shocks, but are assumed to occur. What other factors should be included in the model? In the interest of parsimony, I assume that the only other relevant factor is the past behavior of the actor. This assumption is convenient for two reasons. First, it enables us to distinguish what Goldstein and Freeman (1990, 23) call "policy inertia" (i.e., "that countries tend to keep doing the same things they themselves have been doing in the recent past") from reciprocity. Second, the argument is conveniently captured by a standard set of parameterized action-reaction equations:

$$Y_t = \alpha_1 + \beta_{11} Y_{t-1} + \beta_{12} X_t + \epsilon_{1t} \quad (1)$$

$$X_t = \alpha_2 + \beta_{21} X_{t-1} + \beta_{22} Y_t + \epsilon_{2t} \quad (2)$$

where Y is the conflict sent by one actor to a second actor, X is the conflict sent by the second actor to the first actor, β is the regression coefficient, α is the intercept, ϵ is the error term, and t indicates a given unit of time. These equations can be used to test the reciprocity hypothesis in the following manner: if the regression coefficients for the conflict sent by the adversary (β_{12} and β_{22}) are significant and positive in sign, then this demonstrates that a relationship exists between the conflict sent from the actor to its adversary (the dependent variable) and the conflict sent from the adversary to the actor. Further, if the regression coefficients for each actor's previous level of conflict behavior (β_{11} and β_{21}) are statistically significant, then this demonstrates that there is policy inertia in the system. This is important because if parties to conflict merely reciprocated one another's behavior, then the conflict would be static or would spiral endlessly upward or downward, depending on whether the first action taken was conflictual or cooperative.

Action-reaction models of international relations have not been received without criticism. In particular, Williams and McGinnis (1988; McGinnis and Williams 1989) have borrowed the rational expectations model from economics and argued that it is superior to reciprocity arguments for understanding arms races. Williams and McGinnis develop a "bureaucratic politics" model of the policy process that is driven by intense rivalry between two states. National security elites within each state compete for information that they can use to advance the interests of their agency. They maintain that in dyads characterized by rivalry, states invest heavily in intelligence gathering and this—coupled with the global press network—creates an information-rich environment in which no policymakers have exclusive access to information vis-à-vis other policymakers in that state for any significant period of time. Hence the information that is useful is "outlier" behavior, and it is this behavior that will have an impact on the behavior of the state being modeled. As a consequence, it makes little sense to model international behavior between rivals with action-reaction models because each state is able to anticipate its rival's behavior in real time. McGinnis and Williams (1989, 1104) summarize their argument this way: "We interpret the superpower arms race as a manifestation of a stable system of pervasive rivalry sustained by a process of sophisticated reaction of domestic political competitors using a wide range of information on expected future events to exert influence over policy." Put simply, states will be excellent at predicting their rival's behavior and thus will only take note of it when it deviates from the expected pattern. With respect to statistical modeling, then, we should not expect to find significant β_{12} s and β_{22} s in equations 1 and 2, but *should* find a significant

correlation among the errors, ϵ_{1t} and ϵ_{2t} (for a formal discussion, see Williams and McGinnis 1988).³

More recently, Gates, Quiñones, and Ostrom (1993) have developed a model suggesting that, depending on whether we are modeling major-major or major-minor power interaction (and in whose sphere of influence the minor actor is located), some dyads will exhibit the action-reaction behavior posited by Goldstein and Freeman, some dyads will exhibit the rational expectations behavior posited by Williams and McGinnis, and still others will exhibit both action-reaction and rational expectations behavior. Thus they have bridged the debate to suggest that both reciprocity and rational expectations will be evident in the behavior of states, and have specified conditions under which each can be expected. I try to extend that synthesis, but instead of focusing on the major-minor power dichotomy and spheres of influence, I concentrate on the salience of each actor's behavior to each other actor (driven by either rivalry or friendship) and the development of the actor's bureaucratic capacity.

In this article, I am primarily interested in the behavior of the state in its conflict with dissidents and the dissidents in their conflict with the state. However, because these conflicts take place within a relevant international environment, I contend that both the rebels and the state will monitor and respond to the behavior of relevant states in the international system. Hence we have a system of interaction that may be characterized by action-reaction and/or rational expectations. I wish to specify hypotheses that will enable us to anticipate what dyads will exhibit which—if any—of these relationships. To do so, I consider two nested questions. First, "Does actor X_i believe that actor X_j 's behavior toward X_i —or X_k 's behavior toward X_j —is relevant to their behavior toward X_i ?" Second, if the answer to the first question is affirmative, then, "Is the information environment in which X_i 's decision makers exist sufficiently rich that they can accurately anticipate X_j 's or X_k 's behavior?" If the answer to the first question is no, then we should not find a statistically significant relationship between measures of X_i 's behavior toward X_j and measures of X_j 's behavior toward X_i . Further, we should not find any relationship among the error terms from these equations. However, if the answer to the first question is affirmative, and the answer to the second question is negative, then we should find a statistically significant relationship between measures of X_i 's behavior toward X_j and measures of X_j 's behavior toward X_i . The argument does not comment on whether there should

3. Rajmaira and Ward (1990; Ward and Rajmaira 1992) also focus on error terms and marshal evidence demonstrating that the foreign policy behavior of the United States and Soviet Union are "cointegrated" over time. The argument, however, is substantially different from Williams and McGinnis in that they claim that a reciprocity norm, not rivalry, drives their finding.

be a relationship among the error terms, although one would anticipate that actors engaged in an action-reaction relationship would also take note of deviations, suggesting that the errors would be correlated. Finally, if the answer to both questions is affirmative, then we would not expect to find a statistically significant relationship between measures of X_i 's behavior toward X_j and measures of X_j 's behavior toward X_i . Yet we would anticipate that the error terms would be correlated.

THE "RHODESIA PROBLEM" AS A CASE STUDY: HYPOTHESES

Because I am interested in the behavior of several actors as the conflict evolves over time, the appropriate design to employ is a time-series case study. To test the model, then, we must identify a case of armed intranational conflict. This criterion narrows the field considerably, but still leaves one a great deal of latitude with respect to identifying a temporal-spatial domain over which to collect data. Because I do not intend to make any claims to being able to generalize the results, there are no advantages to be gained by selecting any one case over another.⁴ Some scholars would disagree and make a case for selecting a "hard" or "critical" case on the grounds that if we fail to falsify the theory using such a case, we would have greater confidence in the generalizability of the theory than we would if we were to fail to falsify the theory using any case drawn at random from the population of cases. It is my position that the only way to probe the generalizability of this theory is to test it against a large number of cases—a test of a critical case (however such a case is identified) simply is not convincing.

That explained, the war for national liberation that took place in Zimbabwe—formerly (Southern) Rhodesia—was selected as the spatial domain of the case. With respect to the international system, this conflict was initially defined less by the guerrillas than by the settler state's 1965 rebellion against British colonial rule and the subsequent United Nations comprehensive sanctions. Hence it was often referred to as the "Rhodesia Problem." Because well over 13,000 people were killed during the war between the European settler state and the African nationalists, the case qualifies as an armed intranational conflict. Further, it is an interesting case as it involved a conflict over the political rights of an oppressed racial majority. Thus the case

4. There are, of course, advantages to be gained with respect to documentation of the case in an accessible language, the length of the conflict, and so on. Here I am merely referring to advantages to be gained with respect to increasing our ability to generalize the findings to other cases.

parallels in interesting ways the conflict in South Africa and, if demographic forecasts are borne out, a future Israel (substituting religious for racial conflict). Finally, the case is interesting in that it is one of a limited number of success stories for international peace brokering. Given the current explosion of ethnically based conflict in the world (for a rigorous treatment, see Gurr 1994) and the coterminous outbreak of international efforts to broker transitions from intranational conflict to peace, it is important to learn what we can about cases that involve these phenomena, and the Zimbabwe case has elements of each.

Before turning to the statistical analysis, it will be useful to provide a brief descriptive sketch of the conflict. Doing so is useful not only because it identifies the actors but because it provides some historical context in which one can place the statistical results. The Rhodesians believed that there were two separate conflicts (Flower 1987), whereas the Zimbabwe nationalists and, to a lesser extent, the British believed that there was only one. The Rhodesians viewed their "internal situation" as a matter that they could control and focused their concern on independence from Britain. A self-governing colony since 1923, Rhodesia was nominally ruled by Britain, but the British were reluctant to cede the Rhodesians independence largely because of concern over the status of Africans in the colony. The main nationalist grievance was the lack of a franchise, although economic issues (especially land tenure) were important issues as well. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Rhodesians concentrated on lobbying the British for independence, and the nationalists counter-lobbied against it. The diplomatic dialogue was strained in the early to mid-1960s when it became clear that Britain was going to grant independence to Malawi and Zambia, but not Rhodesia which refused to countenance universal suffrage. In November 1965, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith made a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), and Britain responded by pushing economic sanctions through the United Nations in an effort to frustrate the rebellion. Fourteen years later at a conference in London, the Rhodesian state—then led by an African prime minister elected in the first universal suffrage elections held in Rhodesia—capitulated, and Britain granted independence to Zimbabwe in April 1980.

There were important players beyond the Rhodesian state, the nationalists, and Britain. Excellent case studies exist,⁵ and I will not discuss the case in significant detail, but a brief mention of the others and their role will be

useful. During the 1970s a dizzying series of negotiations took place among the nationalists, the Rhodesian state, Britain, South Africa, the Front-Line Presidents, and, to a lesser extent, the United States.⁶ The Front-Line States supported the nationalists (the Zimbabwe African National Union trained its guerrillas in camps in Mozambique, and the Zimbabwe African People's Union trained its guerrillas in camps in Zambia), and consistently pressured the leaders of the guerrilla groups to unite. However, they were largely dependent—particularly Zambia—on Rhodesia and South Africa for rail transport, and Zambia played a role in helping South Africa to avoid international sanctions and supply Rhodesia with oil and other goods. Whereas the Front-Line States supported the nationalists, South Africa was bitterly opposed to African—especially socialist—rule in Rhodesia, and funneled substantial amounts of military and economic aid into Rhodesia. Nevertheless, they strongly opposed the creation of an apartheid state—which Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front advocated—and Prime Minister Voerster began the so-called *détente* when he secretly approached Zambian President Kaunda in the early 1970s. South Africa's interest in maintaining its hegemony in the region led it to pursue the creation of harmonious relations with the Front-Line States, which in turn dictated that they not allow an apartheid state to develop in Rhodesia. Finally, the United States became involved in the conflict late as Henry Kissinger turned an eye toward southern Africa in the mid- to late 1970s. The United States largely was interested in the region in the context of the cold war, and although it opposed the rebellion against Britain and favored universal suffrage, it was largely concerned about the prospect of Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa (i.e., Namibia), and Rhodesia "falling" into the Soviet camp.

This brief sketch serves to identify the major parties to the conflict and provide a sense of the general contours of their behavior. The nationalists are composed of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, the Zimbabwe African National Union, and the African National Council. The relevant international actors are South Africa, the Front-Line States (Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia), and Britain and the United States (hereafter UK/US). Because a statistical analysis could not be performed if we treated each actor individually, the Front-Line States and the UK/US are treated as two corporate actors; South Africa is treated separately. It turns out that this aggregation is less awkward than might initially be assumed: when one reads descriptive accounts of the conflict (e.g., Martin and Johnson 1981; Davidow 1984;

5. Shamyayirira (1965), Mtshali (1967), Ranger (1970), Sithole (1979), Martin and Johnson (1981), and Nkomo (1984) document the nationalist struggle. Bowman (1973) contains the best account of Rhodesian national politics. Maxey (1975), Cilliers (1985), and Flower (1987) provide the best descriptions of the guerrilla war. Finally, Davidow (1984) and Stedman (1991) review the international diplomacy of the case.

6. The so-called Front-Line Presidents were so named because their states were on the "front line" of the battle against apartheid and colonialism in southern Africa. They consisted of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Seretse Khama of Botswana, and later, Samora Machel of Mozambique.

Stedman 1991), it is quite common to find references to the behavior of the Front-Line Presidents and discussion of the Anglo-American proposals. Having specified the actors, we can return to the hypothesized relationships developed in the previous section and develop actor-specific hypotheses.

Beginning with the domestic actors, there was an intense rivalry between the Zimbabwe nationalists and Rhodesia. Yet because the nationalists did not have a well-structured bureaucracy for gathering and disseminating information, I posit that they will not be able to develop an ability to anticipate Rhodesian behavior and thus will exhibit an action-reaction pattern vis-à-vis Rhodesia. Yet because they are keenly interested in Rhodesia's conflict toward them, I anticipate that they will note and respond to deviations in behavior, which suggests that the error terms will be correlated because Rhodesia is hypothesized (below) to have the same interest in the nationalists' behavior. Internationally, the nationalists invested significant energy mobilizing the international community to sanction Rhodesia,⁷ so I anticipate that they will also exhibit action-reaction behavior toward the conflict sent by the Front-Line States, South Africa, and the UK/US toward Rhodesia. However, I also contend that Rhodesia's behavior toward the relevant actors in the international system will not be of interest to the nationalists: whether Rhodesia sought to accommodate or intimidate Britain or South Africa should not have affected the nationalists; but to the extent that they weakened or strengthened Rhodesia, British or South African efforts to intimidate or accommodate Rhodesia would have affected the nationalists, and hence I expect to find evidence that they monitored and responded to that activity. The absence of rivalry leads me to hypothesize little if any correlation between the nationalists and the international actors' conflict toward Rhodesia. Finally, I contend that the nationalists' past behavior will have an impact on their future behavior (i.e., there will be policy inertia). This last hypothesis is maintained for each actor and is not repeated below.

As the Zimbabwe nationalists are concerned with Rhodesia's behavior toward them, Rhodesia is concerned with the nationalists' behavior when formulating its behavior toward the nationalists. Hence I posit the same relationships: Rhodesia's behavior will be, in part, driven by the nationalists' behavior, and the error terms from the state and nationalists' equations will be correlated. However, I do not anticipate that the state will modify its behavior toward the nationalists in response to its interactions with players in the international system. Although it is the case that Prime Minister Smith agreed to negotiate with the nationalists at Victoria Falls and Geneva in

7. In fact, Joshua Nkomo's international lobbying efforts in the 1960s played a significant role in precipitating the split that led to the formation of the Zimbabwe African National Union.

response to pressure from South Africa, Smith viewed UDI as an issue separate from the guerrilla war: UDI was conceived as a diplomacy issue, whereas the guerrilla war was an internal security issue. Thus, although there are some dramatic moments of linkage among the two in Rhodesia's policy behavior (notably, the two negotiations), there is reason to anticipate that Rhodesia's foreign policy will not be linked with its policy toward the nationalists, nor will the error terms associated with those equations be correlated.

Following Williams and McGinnis, I posit that Rhodesia's foreign policy behavior will be driven by the behavior of relevant states toward Rhodesia, but in situations of rivalry (i.e., toward the Front-Line States and the UK/US) the environment is sufficiently information rich that they will exhibit rational expectations rather than action-reaction behavior. The same set of relationships is anticipated from the other side (i.e., the relevant rival states will not exhibit an action-reaction relationship, but the error terms will be correlated). The Rhodesia-South Africa dyad will also exhibit correlated errors, but not action-reaction because they are allies, and for that reason have strong priors about one another's behavior. Finally, with respect to linkages across Rhodesia's foreign policy toward the three actors, I posit that they will be independent: nothing in the reciprocity literature would lead us to anticipate linkages across these variables.

What about the behavior of South Africa, the Front-Line States, and the UK/US toward Rhodesia? Much of the relevant international actors' interest in Rhodesia was driven by the intranational conflict there. This leads me to anticipate that their behavior toward the state will be linked to the conflict behavior between Rhodesia and the nationalists. To be specific, South Africa is expected to respond to an increase in nationalist conflict with greater cooperation toward Rhodesia. However, because they were interested in a settlement, I posit that they will sometimes respond negatively to an increase in Rhodesian conflict toward the nationalists, but because they were Rhodesia's ally they would, at other times, look the other way or respond positively. In other words, I do not anticipate that South Africa will respond systematically to Rhodesian conflict behavior toward the nationalists. Two sets of interaction would lead one to believe that South African behavior toward Rhodesia will exhibit action-reaction or rational expectations behavior vis-à-vis the interactions between Rhodesia and the other international actors: the détente between South Africa and the Front-Line States in the early to mid-1970s suggests some policy coordination, and the United States' pressure in the mid- to late 1970s suggests reason for interest. However, the study spans over 20 years, and these two sets of interactions appear to be exceptions. South Africa was a regional hegemon during this time period, and I

thus anticipate the evidence will show that South African policy toward Rhodesia did not respond to the interactions between Rhodesia and other international actors.

With respect to the intranational conflict, the Front-Line States are expected to have the opposite relationship toward Rhodesian-nationalist conflict than South Africa, reciprocating Rhodesian behavior and failing to demonstrate a systematic relationship vis-à-vis nationalist conflict behavior. Unlike South Africa, the Front-Line States were largely dependent on South Africa for commercial traffic and thus are hypothesized to monitor and react to South African behavior toward Rhodesia. With respect to the UK/US, the Front-Line States were not only more autonomous but also often shared the same policy objectives of pressuring Rhodesia. Ultimately, however, they had different goals with respect to the Zimbabwe nationalists, and thus I anticipate that Front-Line State behavior toward Rhodesia will be systematically linked to UK/US behavior toward Rhodesia.

Finally, the UK/US were both interested in this conflict within the context of the cold war, but Britain was also driven by Rhodesia's rebellion (UDI). Rhodesia's rebellion created a situation of rivalry. However, Britain's decision to withdraw its diplomatic presence in response to the rebellion hampered its ability to monitor events in Rhodesia. More important, from 1965 to 1979 the relationship was redefined and thus difficult to characterize as stable. Thus I hypothesize that—even though there was significant rivalry—there will be action-reaction behavior. Yet I also anticipate correlated errors behavior because the existence of the rivalry would lead each party to update their expectations in response to surprises. With respect to the intranational conflict, neither the British nor the United States wanted a military victory: they were interested in an electoral compromise. I anticipate that they will respond to increased Rhodesian conflict toward the nationalists with increased conflict toward Rhodesia. Similarly, I expect that they will respond to increases in nationalist conflict with a reduction in their level of conflict toward Rhodesia in an effort not to tip the tables toward the nationalists, who were supported by the USSR and China. Regarding South African and Front-Line States' conflict to Rhodesia, I posit that the UK/US conflict toward Rhodesia will exhibit action-reaction behavior as they were primarily interested in stability in the region and viewed those states as important parts of any negotiated solution. Hence they will monitor and respond to that behavior. However, Rhodesian behavior toward the Front-Line States and South Africa is likely to have been viewed as superfluous from London and Washington: the relevant interactions were Rhodesia and the nationalists, and the regional states' behavior toward Rhodesia. The expected relationships are summarized graphically in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Hypothesized Relationships

DATA AND METHOD

Two data sources were employed in this study: measures of the intranational conflict behavior were drawn from the Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project (VICDP), and measures of the international conflict behavior were drawn from the Cooperation and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB).⁸ The VICDP coding scale is described in some detail in Moore and Lindström (1994) and is presented in Table 1.⁹ To produce a record of events, a coder used the scheme to classify events (or actions) as they were reported in the *New York Times Index*.

8. There are two widely used sources of international events data: COPDAB and the World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS). COPDAB was selected because of its superior temporal coverage of this case (1948 to 1978 vs. 1966 to 1982). I coded the *New York Times Index* and the *Africa Contemporary Record* to produce COPDAB data for the interactions between the relevant states for 1979.

9. The Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project was established to collect events data for the countries of the world in the post-World War II era. During Phase 1, data were collected on five cases, one of which was Zimbabwe. Although the data are well suited for this particular project, like the COPDAB or WEIS data, they might be used for a variety of research projects.

TABLE 1
Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project Coding Scale

1. Agreement-Resolution: The internal war is terminated because the underlying conflict is resolved such that each party's needs are guaranteed.
2. Agreement-Settlement: The internal war is terminated and the underlying conflict settled as a consequence of the construction of institutions that will manage future conflict.
3. Agreement-Termination: The parties agree to terminate the internal war but do not create new institutions for managing the underlying conflict.
4. Statements of Support: One party supports another; rescinding policies aimed at hindering adversary; cease-fire; release of prisoners.
5. Negotiations: Parties to the conflict negotiate with one another.
6. Agreement to Negotiate: Parties to the conflict agree to negotiate with one another.
7. Meetings: Talks about talks; exchanges of officials; dialogue between the parties; statements/expressions of willingness to consider adversary's position; canceling censorship of press.
8. Neutral and "No Comment" Statements: Noncommittal comments regarding other parties to the conflict and their actions; government's release of prisoners against whom it has no case.
9. Mild Verbal Expressions: Mildly negative statements about other parties to the conflict, their representatives, proposals, or activities.
10. Strong Verbal Expressions: Strongly negative statements about other parties to the conflict, their representatives, proposals, or activities.
11. Diplomatic-Economic Hostile Actions: Urging other states to adopt economic sanctions; laws that restrict economic activity of non-Europeans; strikes, consumer boycotts, nonviolent demonstrations.
12. Political-Military Hostile Actions: Demonstrations turned violent (only code state if police/army is sole perpetrator of violence—code nonstate activity as 11; if no state action, code non-European population or group as sole actor); discriminatory laws of a political nature; arrest; sentencing to prison, detention, death, and so on.
13. Small-Scale Military Acts: Land mines; sabotage (nonhuman targets); forced relocation of population (Private Villages); capturing adversary's troops.
14. Limited War Acts: Isolated/sporadic guerrilla activity (human targets); isolated/sporadic human rights violations (Collective Punishment); isolated/sporadic counter-insurgent operations; suspension of civil law in selected areas.
15. Extensive War Acts Causing Deaths, Dislocation, and High Strategic Costs: Regular guerrilla warfare; regular counter-insurgent operations; systematic human rights violations; widespread (> 80% of territory) suspension of civil law.

To translate the record of events into data that can be used in a statistical study, it is first necessary to assign weights to each category of conflict. Then for a given unit of time, one simply multiplies the weight associated with each category of conflict times the number of events recorded in that category for a given actor for that unit of time, and sums the values. This produces a total conflict score for each actor for the given unit of time. The "weights" associated with each category are reported in Table 2.

TABLE 2
Violent Intranational Conflict Data Project Weighting Scheme

Scale	Weight
15	100
14	85
13	65
12	45
11	30
10	15
9	5
8	0
7	5
6	10
5	15
4	25
3	45
2	75
1	100

The VICDP measures of the levels of conflict sent by both the African nationalists and the Rhodesian state are depicted graphically in Figure 2, panel a. The COPDAB data are well known and measure international cooperative and conflictual behavior. The weights described in Azar (1993) were used to create the conflict and cooperation scores. Figure 2, panels b-d trace through time the conflict sent to Rhodesia by the following relevant states: Botswana, Britain, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, the United States, and Zambia. They also depict the time-path of the conflict Rhodesia sent to those states. When discussing these variables, the term *conflict* is used even though the measure is conflict minus cooperation (or net conflict). Hence positive scores indicate net cooperation in a given month, whereas negative scores represent net conflict in that month.

Because I am employing a time-series case study design, the temporal aggregation of the data needs to be addressed. Freeman (1989) demonstrates the importance of properly specifying the unit of time over which one aggregates event data like that used in this study. Freeman is able to show that the results can vary across different aggregations and concludes that we should rely on theory to direct our aggregation decisions. Although strong theory about the unit of time over which guerrillas, the states they challenge,

