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Ethnicity, Minorities, and International Conflict

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While the resurgence of ethno-nationalism throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has refocused the attention of international relations scholars on the ethnic dimensions of international conflict, a linkage between ethnicity and international conflict has yet to be generally accepted within the discipline. In this chapter, we examine the impact of ethnic conflict within states on the occurrence of conflict between states. Using a cross-sectional study of all geographically contiguous dyads in the international system (circa 1978), we examine foreign policy behavior to see if dyads in which there is a minority at risk exhibit different conflict patterns than the system norm. Further, we examine whether state-communal group ethnic affiliations across dyads influence the level of state-to-state conflict within the international system. Finally, we probe the impact that common ethnic ties within dyads have on dyadic interactions.

There are two bodies of literature germane to our inquiry. First, a number of studies have focused on the impact of ethnic conflicts on the behavior of other states. Most of these works are contributions to edited volumes and focus on the impact of a particular ethnic conflict on the foreign relations of the state (e.g., Suhrke and Noble 1977a; Shiels 1984a, Boucher et al. 1987; Chazan 1991). Some of these collections are more theoretical than empirical (such as Rosenau 1964), while others mix theory and evidence (for example, Midlarsky 1992b). Other work on the international relations of ethnic conflict focuses explicitly on the role of third parties as mediators (Halpern 1964; Modelski 1964; Luard 1972a; Suhrke and Noble 1977b; Touval and Zartman 1989;

Stedman 1992; Licklider 1993; McGarry and O'Leary 1993; Haglund and Pentland 1996; James 1996; Kaufman 1996; Ryan 1990a). Finally, some studies explicitly seek to test hypotheses concerning the relationship between ethnic conflict and foreign policy behavior (Heraclides 1990; Midlarsky 1992a; Carment 1993a; Carment et al. 1993a; Carment and James 1994b; Moore and Davis 1994). There is also a small body of literature on the impact of the international system on ethnic conflict within states (Nagel and Whorton 1992; Rasler 1992).

A second body of literature we consider directly relevant focuses on ethnic groups and their conflicts with nation-states (e.g., Young 1982; Horowitz 1985; Gurr 1993a, 1993c; Posen 1993). In these studies, no explicit effort is made to link the conflict with the behavior of other states in the international system, though linkages are often recognized. It is also interesting that many of the case study essays in the edited collections fail to make explicit reference to international linkages, though they often refer to the behavior of one or two key states in the international system that played a role in supporting one side or another in the case at issue.

Unfortunately, in both sets of literature, little effort has been devoted to specifying theoretical linkages between these two types of conflict. As one reviews the descriptive-historical case studies that dominate the literature on ethnic conflict, one cannot help but note that in every case the behavior of other states in the international system is relevant to the tale. From this observation, one might conclude that there is necessarily a linkage. And indeed, we believe it is precisely this conclusion that has led to the publication of some of the edited works. However, we find that Suhrke and Noble (1977c, 230-31) reject the contention that "internal ethnic conflict constitutes a major source of international conflict." Shiels (1984b, 263) describes the international system as relatively immune to the turmoil caused by ethnic strife, but notes that for the handful of states that are involved in a given case, "ethnic separatism can be a very persistent and thorny problem indeed." Assessing the ability of international bodies to regulate internal wars, Luard (1972b, 215) concludes that "the record of international organizations in dealing with civil-war situations so far has been very mixed. Some would even dismiss it." Nevertheless, Heraclides (1990) and Carment (1993a) begin their studies by arguing that the topic has not been given the attention it deserves. In this chapter, we attempt to rectify that neglect.

While it seems clear that in specific instances of ethnically driven domestic conflict, a small subset of international actors can play an important role, we wonder whether the conclusions drawn by Suhrke and Noble, Shiels, and Luard are generalizable. Put simply, no one will contest that a few states in the international system choose to support one side or another in a given ethnic conflict. However, can we take the larger step and argue that ethnic conflicts

have a widespread and important effect on the behavior of states toward one another? In other words, states or domestic actors may support a particular rebel group; but are ethnic conflicts a significant driving force for the pursuit of conflictual foreign policies? More important, can we find such a relationship across a substantial sample of cases?

One can understand the issue in terms of the distinction between structural and behavioral explanations of foreign policy behavior. In explaining the foreign policy of states in the international system, are we better off focusing on the structural attributes of those states or on behavioral variables? Dina Zinnes (1980, 327) argues that "international violence is probably not the result of special conditions but rather the consequence of certain attributes of nations." Nevertheless, we anticipate that ethnic division will *not* drive international conflict patterns and that Suhrke and Noble, Shiels, and Luard drew the proper conclusions. We have designed a study to systematically explore this issue.

Few of the studies mentioned above consider the following question: What implications does this research have for general theories of international politics? While we focus explicitly on the effects of ethnic conflict within states on conflict patterns between states, at a more general level we are concerned with the question of how domestic authority patterns overlap and interact with international authority patterns. In raising this question, we hope to challenge realist assumptions that have traditionally guided the study of international cooperation and conflict. In particular, we seek to examine the realist assumption that sovereign states are the fundamental building blocks of international relations. If, as we suspect, they are not, then we must ask ourselves what the competing authority patterns are that cut across territorial boundaries and influence the interaction of states in the global arena. To answer this question we posit that ethnicity provides an alternative authority pattern to the territorial state which, at least potentially, can have an impact on the dynamics of interstate relations.

Central to the realist perspective on international relations is its treatment of the "state" as a unified actor. International relations theorists argue that since the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the nation-state has represented the theoretical cornerstone to understanding the political dynamics of the international system. However, "to aver that humanity is divided into 'states,' though technically correct, is also trivial because it obscures the equally important fact that humanity is divided in many other ways as well" (Ferguson and Mansbach 1991, 381). Thus, while we accept the notion that the territorial state remains the central actor in the international environment, we also concur with Ferguson and Mansbach's observation that "at best, the state is a primary symbol of identity that competes with other symbols of

identity for the loyalties of citizens. For this reason, it is . . . one of many 'polities' that compete for human loyalties and that form authority relations" in the international system (ibid., 369). As Robert Slater points out (1993), with the collapse of the territorial boundaries of the cold war era, the (re)emergence of nationalist rivalries, and the "New World Order's" revitalization of international and regional organizations, the political influence of the "state" and its analytical usefulness are under considerable challenge and stress.

Stephen Ryan (1990a, xxii-xxiv) points out that beginning in the late 1960s, the "state-centric" approach to international relations came under attack from a variety of quarters, even from scholars who began to make a case for ethnicity as one of what Ferguson and Mansbach call the primary symbols of identity. With a sense of renewed vigor, intellectual challengers to the realist paradigm have begun to create a new research agenda that seeks to elaborate on patterns of authority in the international environment, patterns that either replace (Ferguson and Mansbach 1991) or rival (Rosenau 1990) the state in its authority. Recognizing the influence of both vertical (e.g., territorially defined) and horizontal (e.g., ethnic, class, gender, etc.) authority patterns in global politics, Rosenau (1990, 39) argues that loyalties can be divided among numerous authorities and that humanity should be conceived "as congeries of authority relations."

If we accept Rosenau's contention that there are competing authority patterns in the international system, how does this belief affect the way we study international conflict behavior? Most significantly, this implication forces us to look beyond "national interests" as an explanatory variable of foreign policy behavior. In addition to serving as an instrument for the accumulation of national power, foreign policy actions may also reflect more affective motivations that stem from the commitment of citizens and rulers to authority patterns that transcend national boundaries. By examining the international dimensions of ethnic conflict, we hope to gain further insight into this puzzle.

The ethnic characteristic of a state can be understood as an attribute, in much the same way that the type of authority structure within the state (regime type) is an attribute. While the impact of ethnicity on international interactions has been relatively ignored, the impact of "regime type" has been the focus of considerable recent work. In particular, scholars have found that democracies, while just as war prone as other types of states, almost never fight one another and almost always win the wars they are involved in (see Chan 1984; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Lake 1992; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Russett 1993; Dixon 1994). This set of findings poses a considerable challenge to the realist conceptual framework and its assumption that all states act in the same manner.

Hypotheses

Several scholars have called for students of international politics to disaggregate ethnic conflict as a concept and perform more fine-grained analyses in an effort to locate linkages (for example, Heraclides 1990; Chazan 1991; Carment 1993a). While agreeing with the utility of that approach, we resist that effort in this study. We are interested in performing a broad-gauge, empirical “brush-clearing” exercise. That is, we contend that we are as yet unfamiliar with the empirical cross-national terrain. Thus it will be useful to establish what that terrain looks like before we do more fine-grained analyses.

Conceptually, then, we are first interested in whether the mere existence of a politicized communal group in a given state has an impact on the level of interstate conflict between that state and others in the international system. The concept of a “politicized communal group” was developed by Gurr for his Minorities at Risk project. According to Gurr (1993c, 163), politicized communal groups are identified by one or both of the following criteria: first, the group collectively suffers from systematic discriminatory treatment by the state or other groups in society; second, the group orchestrates political mobilization in defense of its self-defined interests. This concept is useful to us because it is broad-gauge: that is, it does not simply apply to ethnic groups that are actively engaged in armed conflict with the state that claims sovereignty over disputed territory. Yet it is not so fine-grained as to be meaningless (i.e., it applies not to ethnic groups as a whole, but rather to *politicized* ethnic groups). We recognize that this conceptualization provides a stiff test for the hypothesized linkage between ethnic conflict and international behavior and we are dubious about the presence of a linkage so broadly conceived.

Gurr (1993a) describes the data set in significant detail.¹ While the United Nations University (1987) indicates that there are more than 5,000 distinct ethnic groups in the world, Gurr’s Minorities at Risk data set identifies 227 *ethnic groups at risk*, making up more than 17 percent of the world’s population and affecting over 70 percent of the countries of the globe. The Minorities at Risk data set is made up of countries with a population of over 1 million and with ethnic groups that account for at least 1 percent of the country’s population. Further, many distinct groups are treated as a single group in several countries to facilitate the collection of data (Gurr 1993a, 3–10). Table 8.1 presents a brief overview of the politicized communal groups by region in 1990.

The evolution of politicized communal groups throughout the world has been documented by Myron Weiner among others. Weiner suggests (1987, 36–37): “In country after country, a single ethnic group has taken control of the state and used its powers to exercise control over others. . . . In retrospect there has been far less ‘nation-building’ than many analysts had expected or

TABLE 8.1 Countries with Politicized Communal Groups in 1990

	No. of Countries in Region with Politicized Groups	Percent in Region	No. of Groups in Region
Advanced industrial democracies	12	57	23
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union	5	55	32
East, Southeast, and South Asia	15	71	42
North Africa and the Middle East	11	58	29
Africa south of the Sahara	29	81	72
Latin America and the Caribbean	17	81	29
Totals	89	70	227

Source: Gurr 1993c, 165.

Notes: Gurr’s Minorities at Risk data set is made up of countries with a population of over 1 million and with ethnic groups that account for at least 1 percent of the country’s population.

hoped, for the process of state-building has rendered many ethnic groups devoid of power or influence.” Moreover, the existence of politicized communal groups within the international system has produced a more perplexing and intractable form of conflict than that associated with the conflict of the cold war era. “They often appear intractable because the well-worn policy tools of economic reform and counterinsurgency neither satisfy nor suppress the underlying desires of the protagonists to protect and assert their group identities” (Gurr and Marshall 1990, 8). In fact, between 1945 and 1990, 51 (22 percent) of the politicized communal groups listed in table 8.1 have supported serious insurgency campaigns, while 142 (63 percent) have taken some kind of violent political action against the state (Gurr and Marshall 1990).

Well-worn historical anecdotes from World War I suggest that the existence of politicized communal groups and ethnic conflict within states have a tendency to spill over into the international arena. This assumption was key to Woodrow Wilson’s “League philosophy,” which posits that self-determination is essential to creating a stable and peaceful international environment. What Suhrke and Noble (1977b) dub “the Wilson proposition” challenges realist notions of international relations by contending that, in the postwar era, states formulate policy in an effort to guarantee the rights of self-determination to the peoples of the globe. This is similar to the theory of instrumental versus affective motivation for foreign policy advanced by Suhrke and Noble (*ibid.*) and echoed by Heraclides (1990), Carment (1993a), and Stack (this volume). Thus, we advance the hypothesis that states that have a minority at risk will have more conflictual relations with other states than those that do not, because other states value the right of people to engage in self-determination.

Hypothesis 1: Conflict levels, including war, between any two countries will be higher if there is a minority at risk in at least one of the countries.

Moreover, ethnic identities rarely coincide fully with the territorial boundaries of the modern state. According to Gurr and Marshall (1990), while most ethnic groups are concentrated in one of several adjacent regions, more than one-third of the groups have kindred distributions across three or more countries.

Given the significance of ethnic authority patterns in such cases, the relationships between states that share a common language, religion, or culture will tend to be imbued with a powerful affective component. In other words, these states can be said to be united by stronger horizontal authority patterns than those with fewer shared symbols of ethnic identity. Under these conditions, strong partisan alignments will be present between states with similar ethnic ties or between a state with a specific cultural affinity to a disadvantaged communal group in another country. Again, this is an affective motivation: states' foreign policy is determined not strictly by national interest, but by citizens' or elites' ethnic ties to kindred groups in other states. Shiels (1984a; 1984b, 11) generalizes Suhrke and Noble's (1977c) finding that affective involvement across borders increases the likelihood of partisan violence, and Vasquez (1992), Zartman (1992) and Moore and Davis (1994) argue that "ethnic alliances" may be one of the mechanisms by which ethnic conflict spills across borders. Both Shiels (1984b) and Suhrke and Noble (1977b) expect this relationship to exist because the neighboring states' support for their rebel group will increase the group's ability to wage violence. Rather than focus on the impact of this linkage on the internal conflict of a state, we anticipate that the existence of such an ethnic linkage will lead to conflict between the two states. Thus we offer the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Conflict levels, including war, between any two countries will be higher if there is a minority at risk in one state and members of the same minority group are in power in the other state.

Finally, while we hypothesize that affective motivations are important determinants of the internationalization of ethnic conflict, instrumental motivations cannot be ignored. Even in situations where horizontal authority patterns are weak, states' foreign policy behavior may be affected by the presence of ethnic groups. Two scenarios present themselves. First, when two states face a conflict with a common minority group, they may cooperate and join forces in the face of a common enemy. This possibility is expressed in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: When the same minority is at risk in two states, the intrastate conflict levels will be high and those states will exhibit more cooperative interaction patterns.

Second, states may involve themselves in foreign ethnic conflicts to bolster their political, economic, or military standing in the region. This is especially likely in situations where external actors can easily exploit ethnic conflict to their own benefit at little direct cost to themselves. According to Suhrke and Noble (1977b, 6), ethnic conflict "provides a tempting opportunity for outsiders to use it for their own ends. The temptation lies in the fact that a situation exists that can be exacerbated easily; a minimal intervention provides a proportionately greater effect." In other words, if one country has a national interest in the political disruption or demise of another, "the prospects of a relatively 'cheap' intervention will suggest cost-benefit calculations in favor of such action" (ibid.).

While domestic ethnic conflict can provide a convenient pretext for increases in bellicose foreign policy behavior, states are unlikely to involve themselves in the ethnic disputes of other states without first calculating the costs involved in such an action. If the affective argument made in H_2 holds, then the costs incurred in such actions are largely dependent on the magnitude of grievances experienced by the minority at risk. This is the case because the level of grievances experienced by the group helps determine their potential for collective action against the state (Gurr 1993c, 166-67). Therefore, the higher the levels of grievances experienced by the communal group, the higher their potential for collective action and the greater the marginal rate of return on involvement incurred by external actors. On the other hand, the lower the level of discrimination and magnitude of grievances, the weaker the group's prospect for effective collective action and the higher the costs entailed in external involvement. This discussion can be formalized in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: The higher the magnitude of grievances experienced by the minority group, the higher the level of international conflict, including war, will be between any two countries.

Gurr's argument, which leads to H_4 , follows a somewhat circuitous route between latent mobilization and intervention. While we anticipate that the hypothesized relationship will exist, a stronger linkage should be found between actual mobilization and higher conflict within a dyad. That is, states will not only monitor discrimination in an effort to assess latent mobilization potential, but will also monitor actual mobilization. This leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 5: The higher the level of mobilization evidenced by the minority group, the higher the level of international conflict, including war, between any two countries.

Design, Data, and Methods

How can one determine whether the presence of ethnic groups at risk has an impact on international conflict? With respect to research design, we wish to determine whether knowing the status of ethnic groups at risk tells us anything about international interactions. We seek to evaluate this issue at the most general level that is possible. We also hope to determine whether the presence of ethnic groups is systematically related to international behavior.

While scholars have debated the position that interactions between two given states are best understood as a consequence of the behavior of the two states, rather than of the attributes of those states, we choose to treat ethnicity as an attribute in much the same manner as regime type in the context of international interactions. We focus on dyads because they serve well as a unit of analysis when one looks at the impact of attributes on states' conflict behavior. That is, if we want to know whether a state's behavior toward another state is affected by the presence of a given attribute, then we need to study dyads (Most and Starr 1989; Siverson and Starr 1991). If it can be shown that this linkage existed across a sample of all states (rather than a sample of a few states experiencing severe ethnic conflict), then we would become believers. However, it would be unreasonable to examine all dyads. Thus, we restrict ourselves to dyads in which conflict/cooperation is likely. Since we are particularly interested in conflict, we restrict ourselves to bordering dyads. Following Siverson and Starr (1991), we use a sample in this analysis consisting of all geographically adjoining dyads in the international system ($n = 282$) (land borders only; in creating their contiguous borders data set, Siverson and Starr also include water borders of less than two hundred miles). In the Siverson and Starr approach, borders are used to operationalize the *opportunity* concept and *alliances* are used to measure willingness. We are not interested in studying diffusion, but rather conflict and cooperation, so we replace alliances with ethnicity variables. Thus, our work builds on the *opportunity and willingness* approach advocated by Starr.

The data are from two sources: Azar's Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB, April 1982), which measures the international event interactions of all states in the international system from 1948 to 1979 on a fifteen-point scale ranging from *very cooperative* to *very conflictual*; and Gurr's Minorities at Risk project. Four measures of the broadly defined dependent variable (international interactions) are used in the analysis. These are: average conflict sent, average cooperation sent, net interactions, and war between the members of each dyad during the 1977–1978 period. *Average conflict* is a measure of the intensity of the conflict within the dyad, and is the sum total of weighted conflict within the dyad, with controls for the number of interactions. *Average coop-*

eration is a measure of the average level of cooperation within the dyad; it was constructed by taking the total cooperation and dividing it by the number of interactions. *Net interactions* is the average level of cooperation within the dyad, less the average level of conflict. *War* is a measure of the direct violent interactions within the dyad; it was constructed by adding up the weighted COPDAB events in which armed clashes took place between the members of the dyad (i.e., a score of 13, 14, or 15 on the COPDAB scale).

The independent variables in the analysis are all measures of the status of minorities within the dyad. All measures of the independent variables are from Gurr (1993a). *Minorities at risk* is a dummy variable indicating the existence of at least one minority at risk within the dyad. *Advantaged ethnic link* is an indicator of the position of the minority group within the other society in the dyad, with a value of 1 indicating that the minority in state A is incorporated into the power structure of state B, and 0 indicating that the minority at risk in state A is not incorporated into the power structure of state B. Our third independent variable, *same advantaged ethnic link*, is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when the same ethnic group is incorporated into the power structure in both states. Our fourth independent variable is a measure of the aggregate level of grievances experienced by the ethnic group (Lee 1993, 22). A final independent variable measures the extent of mobilization of the minority group. The Minorities at Risk data contain information on the amount of rebellion each minority group engaged in during the late 1970s. That variable is used as our measure of ethnic mobilization.

In all equations, we use a dummy variable to control for the democratic status of the dyad, with 1 indicating that *both states* are democracies and 0 indicating that is not the case. We use the Maoz and Russett (1992) measure for democracy, constructed from the Polity II data.

In the results presented below, we analyze the impact that the existence of minorities, their position within the political structure, and the level of discrimination/grievances they experience have on a number of measures of the level of conflict and cooperation within the dyad. Given the hypotheses outlined above, we would expect to find the following relationships:

H₁: We expect the existence of a minority at risk within the dyad to be negatively related to the average level of cooperation and positively related to the level of conflict. The variable net interactions will be negatively related to the existence of a minority group. Finally, we expect war, like conflict, to be positively influenced by the existence of a minority at risk.

H₂: We expect the advantaged ethnic link variable, which indicates whether the minority at risk in state A has political power in state B, to display the

same type of linkages as the presence of a minority at risk. In particular, it will be positively related to conflict and war and negatively related to cooperation and net interactions.

H₃: We expect the same advantaged minority variable, a dummy variable indicating the existence of a common minority group within the dyad, to be positively associated with cooperation and negatively associated with conflict.

H₄: We expect the grievances indicator to be negatively related to net interactions and average cooperation, and positively related to war and average conflict.

H₅: We expect mobilization to be negatively related to net interactions and average cooperation, and positively related to war and average conflict.

Throughout the results, we expect that democratic dyads will exhibit different patterns of behavior. Specifically, we expect the democratic dyad variable to be positively related to the level of cooperation and net interactions, and negatively related to conflict and war.

Results

We examined the impact that ethnic ties and the status of minorities have on the four measures of our dependent variable (net conflict, average conflict, average cooperation, and violent hostilities). Table 8.2 presents the results of our analyses with parameter estimates, their associated *t*-ratios, and the *F*-ratio for the equation. Goodness of fit statistics are not reported because we anticipate that ethnic conflict has an impact on foreign policy behavior only at the margins. Hence, one would anticipate that our equations will not account for a substantial amount of the variance in foreign policy behavior. In fact, the R²'s for our equations were all less than .10. Coefficients for ethnic tie, mobilization, and grievances are significant at the .10 level or greater.

These results provide some support for our hypotheses. The first equation regressed net interactions on the independent variables and failed to produce any significant parameter estimates. This raises significant specification concerns, but is not surprising given that we only expect the structural and behavioral aspects of ethnicity to influence foreign policy behavior on the margins. The implication from this first run is that ethnicity does not influence overall international behavior within dyads.

A slightly modified picture emerges, however, when we consider the second equation, which concentrates on belligerent foreign policy behavior. These estimates indicate that the existence of an ethnic tie between a minority at risk and the same group in power across the border has a significant impact upon

TABLE 8.2 Impact of Ethnic Ties and Status of Minorities

Dependent Variable	Independent Variables	Coefficient	t-Ratio	F-Statistic
Net interactions (N = 279)				
	Democratic dyad	0.97	0.28	2.32
	Minority	-0.69	-0.25	
	Ethnic tie	-3.43	-1.33	
	Same minority at risk	0.21	0.07	
	Grievances	-0.18	-1.28	
	Mobilization	-0.28	-0.65	
	Constant	6.53		
War (N = 278)				
	Democratic dyad	1.67	0.02	3.58*
	Minority	33.97	0.36	
	Ethnic tie	278.11	3.20*	
	Same minority at risk	73.63	0.74	
	Grievances	-4.52	-0.98	
	Mobilization	35.88	2.44*	
	Constant	-1.34		
Average cooperation (N = 281)				
	Democratic dyad	2.71	1.73	1.82
	Minority	-1.04	-0.80	
	Ethnic tie	-1.77	-1.49	
	Same minority at risk	0.05	0.03	
	Grievances	0.03	0.54	
	Mobilization	-0.24	-1.18	
	Constant	12.94		
Average conflict (N = 279)				
	Democratic dyad	1.57	0.53	2.02
	Minority	-0.92	0.38	
	Ethnic tie	-1.90	0.85	
	Same minority at risk	-0.10	0.04	
	Grievances	0.24	2.04*	
	Mobilization	0.04	0.09	
	Constant	6.20		

* = significant at the .10 level or greater.

belligerent foreign policy behavior within a dyad. This serves as conditional support for H_2 : ethnic ties have a positive impact upon warlike behavior in bordering dyads. The mobilization variable was also significant and in the expected direction, providing conditional support for H_3 : ethnic groups that successfully mobilize for rebellion tend to exist in dyads characterized by higher levels of conflicts between the two states. This finding is consistent with Suhrke and Noble (1977a) and Heraclides (1990).

We also separated cooperative and conflictual behavior into two separate variables. Interestingly, democratic dyad—our control variable—was only significant with respect to cooperation (and then only at the .10 level): in none of the other three equations did it come close to statistical significance. None of the other variables had statistically significant parameter estimates, suggesting that the ethnic structure of states and the ethnic conflict within states does not influence cooperative foreign policy behavior.

Finally, the only variable that has a significant impact on average conflict is the level of grievances. This supports H_4 , but counters H_5 . To that extent, we are a bit puzzled. It would not have been too surprising had both grievances and mobilization been insignificant, but we did not expect that grievances would have an impact while mobilization did not. This finding undermines the instrumental argument we made concerning the hypotheses and is consistent with an affective interpretation. That is, if states are being instrumental, then they should respond to less ambiguous information (i.e., they would be more responsive to mobilization than to grievances, though they might respond to both). However, an instrumentally motivated state would not be responsive to information of poor quality in the presence of better information. The affective argument nevertheless suggests that states will be responsive to the plight of their brethren (such as grievances). Mobilization does not necessarily imply high levels of grievances (in fact, the two are not highly correlated). Thus, the finding that grievances drive dyadic conflict levels is not only inconsistent with the instrumental motivation of H_4 and H_5 , but is consistent with an alternative affective motivation of those two hypotheses.

To recapitulate, the results of the analyses are mixed. We never locate strong, statistically significant support for the argument that the existence of a minority group within a dyad is associated with the foreign policy behavior of the states in that dyad. Thus, the argument advanced in H_1 —that the ethnic makeup of a state has an influence on interdyadic behavior—must be rejected. We find conditional support (i.e., in the particular case of violent hostilities) for H_2 , which argues that the across-dyad position of other members of the minority group makes an important difference in understanding interstate conflict behavior. We reject H_3 , which anticipated that conflict would be lower and cooperation higher in dyads that shared the same minority group at risk within

each state. Both H_4 and H_5 are supported to a limited degree by the results of our analysis. The argument that the conditions under which the minority lives act as a cue for states seeking to advance their interests is not supported in the case of average conflict—where grievances are positively related to the level of conflict within the dyad. However, when we examine war—where mobilization increases the level of conflict—we find support for the instrumental position.

We began this investigation with the assumption that ethnicity is unlikely to be systematically related to the international behavior of states, and as a consequence, we intentionally invoked a broad-gauged conceptualization of the ethnic factor. Our results indicate that, though the simple presence of a politicized communal group will not measurably influence foreign policy behavior, such behavior is affected by the presence of an advantaged majority in one state when the same minority is at risk in an adjacent state. Further, the extent to which they are either experiencing grievances or have mobilized against the state further influences foreign policy behavior. Finally, the presence of the same minority at risk across two states does not lead them to join common cause. Thus, we find support for our skepticism in that the most broad hypothesis must be rejected, but we must revise our beliefs in the face of support for hypotheses 2, 4, and 5.

Conclusion and Implications

Several recent studies (Heraclides 1990; Chazan 1991; Carment 1993a) attempt to designate more effective categories of ethnic conflict, which may be secessionist, irredentist, anticolonialist or other. We have ignored that call in this study and sought to determine whether we could find a linkage between ethnic conflict and international behavior, treated grossly. Whereas we anticipated that our null findings would lend greater credence to the recent calls by Heraclides and others, we find that we have unearthed just such evidence of that gross linkage. Nevertheless, as the Carment study demonstrates (1993a), it is useful to perform more discriminating analyses and to search for better specified patterns using less general conflict categories. This is a fruitful direction for future study and we urge others to join us in pursuing it.

An additional problem with our study concerns the temporal domain of the sample. It is quite possible that these results are an artifact of the international behavior of states in 1977–1978. To the extent that those are representative years, our results will stand. However, if those years were unusual, then these results will not hold for a more comprehensive temporal frame. We were constrained with respect to our domain by the data set. The Minorities at Risk data are from about 1985 and the latest years for which we could find interna-

TABLE 8.3 Neighboring States in Which Ethnic Groups Are in Power in One State and at Risk Across the Border

<i>Status of Minority Group</i>		<i>Status of Minority Group</i>	
<i>Advantaged</i>	<i>At Risk</i>	<i>Advantaged</i>	<i>At Risk</i>
Afghanistan	Pakistan	Lesotho	South Africa
Albania	Yugoslavia	Malaysia	Singapore
Angola	South Africa	Mauritania	Morocco
Belgium	United Kingdom	Mauritania	Algeria
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	Ghana	Mexico	United States
Cambodia	North Vietnam	Mozambique	South Africa
Chad	Sudan	North Vietnam	Cambodia
China	North Vietnam	Pakistan	India
Congo	Angola	Romania	Bulgaria
Egypt	Israel	Rwanda	Burundi
France	United Kingdom	Saudi Arabia	Israel
Haiti	Dominican Republic	Singapore	Indonesia
Hungary	Romania	Somalia	Ethiopia
Hungary	Yugoslavia	Somalia	Kenya
India	Bangladesh	South Korea	Japan
Ireland	United Kingdom	Swaziland	South Africa
Jordan	Israel	Syria	Lebanon
Lebanon	Egypt	Syria	Israel
Lebanon	Israel	Turkey	Bulgaria
		Zaire	Angola

tional events data were 1977–1978. We did not extend the events data further back (say, to 1975) because, although ethnic variables are sticky with respect to time, they are not constant.

Ideally, we would approach this study in a different manner. Because of data constraints, we use a cross-national study of a single time period using societal level measures of ethnicity. To draw conclusions about the existence and nature of ethnic/international conflict ties, we would prefer to have time-series data measuring both ethnically driven domestic political activity and international interactions. If such data were available, we would be able to tell something about the direction of this linkage and the process through which the two interact. Currently we are constrained in our ability to address this issue.

We close with a brief consideration of policy implications. We shall set aside the ethical and humanitarian imperatives that press states to intervene and mediate both ethnic and international conflicts and instead focus directly on security issues. First, a list of “high risk” states can be easily constructed in accord with hypothesis 2 (see table 8.3). That is, the international community

would do well to monitor the relations between states where an ethnic group is in power in state A and at risk in state B across a border. Regional nongovernment organizations might play a role by offering good offices to mediate any conflicts that appear to be heating up.

Second, reports of human rights groups and intelligence reports that suggest that an ethnic group is being further persecuted should not be ignored on geopolitical grounds when members of that same ethnic group have power in a neighboring state. That is, simply because a given country does not fall within the strategic domain of others does not mean that instability in that country can be safely ignored. This study shows that ethnic instability has a relationship to international conflict when a cross-border ethnic linkage exists. Hence, not only should interactions between these “high risk” states be monitored, but the internal situation between the state and the ethnic groups should be monitored as well.