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CHAPTER FOUR

Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy

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CONSIDER the following stylized account of events in northern Zaire in the fall of 1996.¹ Zairean rebels of Tutsi heritage launched military attacks with the avowed goal of toppling Mobutu Sese Seko's regime. This rebellion followed a shift from Hutu to Tutsi control of the Rwandan state, which borders Zaire to the north. One consequence of the Tutsi rebellion in northern Zaire was strained relations between Rwanda and Zaire: conflict short of war. These events provide an example of what we refer to in this study as an "ethnic alliance," and provide a concrete example of the phenomenon explored here: the extent to which shared ethnic ties between a group that controls a state and kin who are disadvantaged in a neighboring state lead to international tension between the two states.

The Zairean case is but one example of ethnic conflict behavior in the 1990s, and these events have produced an upsurge in interest among international relations scholars, policy makers, and pundits. Concern over ethnic conflict might be driven by a number of motivations: first, a partisan interest in the winners and losers; second, a humanitarian interest in stopping the suffering and killing; and/or third, a security-driven interest in global peace. The first motivation is generally held by politicians and pundits with axes to grind whereas scholars typically hold either the second or third motivation, or a mix of both. Like the others in this volume, this chapter is motivated by the third interest.

Several scholars have sought to contribute to our understanding of conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and policy prescriptions for third parties who seek to intervene (Halpern 1964; Modelski 1964; Luard 1972; Suhrke and Noble 1977;

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¹ We would like to thank David Pion-Berlin for suggesting that these events illustrate our argument.

Touval and Zartman 1989; Ryan 1990; Stedman 1991; Licklider 1993; McGarry and O'Leary 1993b; Carment and James 1997). Yet, as Lake and Rothchild note in the introductory chapter, it is difficult to find work that theoretically specifies the linkage between ethnic conflict and global peace. Further, although it is possible to find assertions that such a linkage exists, there is little systematic, empirical work that demonstrates the existence of such a linkage. This paper addresses those shortcomings.

What is the conventional wisdom regarding the escalation of ethnic conflict (that is, the relationship between domestic ethnic conflict and international conflict behavior)? Until recently, little has been said beyond "ethnicity matters." Let us examine the state of the literature. Maynes (1993) criticizes the Clinton administration's efforts to employ a collective security solution to contain ethnic conflict. His argument is motivated by the contention that ethnic conflict must be contained because "animosity among ethnic groups is beginning to rival the spread of nuclear weapons as the most serious threat to peace that the world faces" (5). This assertion rests on the claim that an ethnic conflict between Russia and the Baltic states would dim "many of the hopes for a new, more cooperative world" (5). Beyond that, Maynes does not explain this assertion. Perhaps he, like Moynihan (1993), is drawing "lessons" from the past. Moynihan approvingly cites Halévy (1930) and Schmitt (1958), who contend that World War I was the outcome of conflict between minorities and states over the right to self-determination. He then asserts: "The ethnic perspective can lay claim to some predictive power. Only some. But enough to warrant more respect than it has perhaps received" (Moynihan 1993, 32). Moynihan is not speaking solely about international relations, but it is clear that he believes that ethnicity ought to be considered as an important variable when discussing international relations and global order and peace. Yet he, like Maynes, fails to specify for us precisely what linkage exists between ethnic conflict and foreign policy behavior. Surely, there is more that we can say than "1914!"

In fact, Midlarsky (1992, 173) sketches for us "an influence of communal violence on the probability of systemic war" (that is, war that leads to the breakdown of the international system). He embeds his analysis in his (1988) model of systemic war in which resource inequality triggers alliance formation, and memory of past conflicts can then generate an overlap in conflict domains or structures. He contends that this is typically followed by an actual or perceived change in the balance of power, which leads to systemic war. What is the impact of communal conflict on this sequence? Midlarsky contends that the most likely entry points are the distribution of resources—triggering resource inequality—or the balance of power. Presumably, some sort of balance or power image undergirds the arguments made by Maynes and Moynihan. Hence, Midlarsky sketches a theoretical argument that enables one to identify a linkage between ethnic conflict and international conflict: it directly or indirectly upsets the balance of power and can lead to systemic war. That said, we must note that Midlarsky (1988) identifies only eight systemic wars between 500 B.C. and the present. Thus, although these linkages clearly can have an enormous impact, they apparently do not do so fre-

quently. It is worth asking whether these linkages exist not only in the case of systemic wars or crises but also in run-of-the-mill foreign policy behavior.

Carment and James (1995, 1997) and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1995, 1997) have also studied the impact of ethnicity on international crises. Carment and James (1995) begin by rejecting the distinction that is frequently made between affective and utilitarian models of ethnic conflict in favor of a rational choice synthesis of the two. They then propose a series of hypotheses suggesting that crises with an irredentist dimension will be more violent and drawn out. They use the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data to demonstrate that crises with an irredentist dimension display higher levels of perceived threat, more conflictual crisis management techniques, and greater violence. In a different study, Carment and James (1997) develop a two-level game theory argument about the linkages between ethnic national mobilization and international crisis behavior. They hypothesize that states that are ethnically homogeneous and have low constraints are most likely to be involved in interstate conflict, and those that are ethnically heterogeneous and highly constrained will be the least likely to be involved in interstate conflict, with the others filling out the continuum. They further hypothesize that the same rankings will be observed across the types of states with respect to the extent to which the conflicts become protracted, and the opposite rank order will be observed with respect to the effects of ethnic affinities and cleavages on the severity of the violence that results from the crisis. They perform a data analysis using the ICB data, and find support for the second and third hypotheses, but not the first.

Following work by Carment (1993; Carment and James 1995), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1995, 1997) engage in more ad hoc hypothesis-generating exercises. They simply propose that crises that have ethnic dimensions are likely to be distinct from those that do not. More specifically, ethnic crises are more likely to: have more violent triggers; involve higher perceived threats to basic values; induce a resort to violence and to higher levels of violence; involve the use of violence as the primary means; induce political rather than military activity by major powers; attract greater participation by global organizations; have a higher incidence of stalemate/compromise outcomes; and to be terminated by less formal agreements. Although the data analysis—also using the International Crisis Behavior data—does not provide unequivocal and strong support for each of their hypotheses, most receive some support, and the general pattern that emerges is that interstate crises with an ethnic dimension do differ from those without one.

Marshall (1993) argues that an unnecessary and counterproductive dichotomy between interstate and intrastate conflict has been constructed, a situation that needs rectification. He develops a macrosociological theory of social conflict that seeks to explain communal conflict and systemic war as driven by a single process. Preliminary statistical analyses (1997) offer support for the hypotheses derived from his theory. Without either presenting or critiquing his work, we wish to make note of another point he makes during his critique of extant construction of conflict typologies: wars are rare events. Further, so are crises. However, states interact with one another with high frequency. Whereas studies

like those by Midlarsky, Carment and James, and Brecher and Wilkenfeld limit their analyses to events like systemic wars or crises, we wish to explore whether ethnicity influences conflict and cooperation more generally. That is, we suspect that if ethnicity matters at all—and it appears to—it ought to matter all the time across the entire range of foreign policy behavior, not only during crises and war.

In fact, Davis, Jagers, and Moore (1997) specify a statistical model that purports to account for variance in conflictual behavior short of war as well as war itself. In that study the dependent variable includes the entire range of cooperative and conflictual foreign policy behavior as measured by the Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB) (Azar 1980). However, rather than develop a theoretical argument, that paper presents some ad hoc hypotheses that are developed by assuming that a linkage exists, and asks what it might look like. The only theoretical contention advanced in the study is that the results undermine the realist project. The current project addresses that shortcoming by developing an argument that produces a hypothesis that a linkage exists and then tests it (along with some secondary hypotheses) using an expanded spatial domain, controlling for democracy.

Preliminary studies of international conflict behavior suggest that ethnicity matters: we find support for Moynihan's contention that ethnicity has some explanatory utility. In this paper we seek to develop an argument, albeit a very simple one, to explain why it does. We contend that ethnicity is important because ethnic ties among peoples across state borders in the international system act as unstated alliances among those people. The term *alliance*, in this case, refers to "a similarity or relationship in character, structure, etc.; affinity"² rather than the more traditional meaning of the term in international relations. Transnational ethnic ties may represent an opportunity for elites in many societies to mobilize political support by using ethnic appeals to vilify a rival state for its treatment of ethnic brethren (Horowitz 1985, 291). Further, the elites of the ethnic minority in the second state have an interest in forging a relationship with the first state, particularly if geography makes an irredentist option feasible. In this manner, we contend that similar ethnic groups distributed across different states will be likely to form what are, in effect, alliances. These ethnic alliances should behave much as alliances between states have been hypothesized to behave in international relations. These hypotheses are developed more fully below.

ARGUMENT AND HYPOTHESES

In our earlier study (Davis, Jagers, and Moore 1997) we found support for the argument that there is a connection between the dyadic conflict level between two neighboring states and the presence of a disadvantaged ethnic minority in one state when members of that same minority group are in power in the other. How can we explain that linkage? Some would contend that ethnic affinity or a

² Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary,

similar "affective" explanation would suffice. We pursue an alternative possibility. As noted above, we contend that it is useful to conceptualize ethnic linkages among people across state boundaries as functionally equivalent to alliances between two states. Siverson and Starr (1991) identify alliances as a major factor in the diffusion of war. They contend that "alliances can be seen as important components of the incentive structures available for states" (24). From there they argue that "borders and alliances create the salience and/or the ease of interaction that significantly increases the probability that states will join ongoing wars" (93). That is, even though doing so involves putting one's soldiers in battle, states often honor their commitments to allies and join wars: war diffuses through the international system as a consequence of alliances.

We are not interested in the diffusion of international conflict per se; rather we are interested in the escalation of ethnic conflict to international conflict. If alliances affect decision making, interactions, and the size of international wars, what does conceptualizing ethnicity as an alliance purchase? Siverson and Starr develop their argument in a geopolitical context that takes into consideration similar policy preferences, and suggest that states form alliances because they share similar geopolitical goals. We contend that different members of the same minority group will—rightly or wrongly—assume that their kin share similar policy preferences. We are not simply arguing that some kind of ethnic "affinity" leads to alliance-like bonds between ethnically homogeneous elites. Rather, we are contending that they expect to share policy preferences, and that they therefore expect to share similar geopolitical preferences. Hence we do not measure the presence or absence of such shared preferences in our sample. Instead, we assume that it exists and tease out the implications of that assumption for dyadic conflict behavior in the international system. Further, we note parenthetically that a threat to kin across a border can aid state building by providing a state with an issue around which to mobilize popular ethnic support for the regime. These arguments lead us to suggest the following stylized set of interactions:

t: An ethnic group experiences increasing persecution from State B (where it does not have access to power), or mobilizes and challenges State B's authority/sovereignty, which leads State B to countermobilize against the ethnic group.

t+1: If members of the ethnic group share power or are dominant in State A and State B falls within the Politically Relevant International Environment (PRIE; Maoz 1997) of State A, then State A will take an interest in the relations between State B and the ethnic group, and will respond to the situation by increasing its hostility toward State B.

In other words, conflict between a state and an ethnic group will escalate to the international level when other elite members of that same ethnic group play a role in policy making in another state and that state finds the first state to be politically relevant, given its resource constraints.

This stylized scenario leads us to posit the following hypotheses, which we divide into three categories: attributes, discrimination/grievances, and mobilization.

Attributes

Dyads (that is, a pair of states) with a transnational ethnic tie, in which members of the ethnic group are disenfranchised in one of the states, will produce higher levels of conflict behavior than other dyads. That is, we expect the following attribute to have a statistically significant impact on dyadic conflict behavior: when both states contain group members from the same ethnic group, but the group is incorporated into the power structure in only one of the two states.

H1: The level of conflict between two states will be higher if both states contain group members from the same ethnic group, and one of the co-ethnics is politically privileged in its society, but its brethren in the other state are not.

Discrimination/Grievances

Because they provide ethnic kin in a rival state a stronger case upon which to mobilize ethnic supporters, and because mobilization contributes to the state building project when the kin without access to state power are victims of discrimination, the conflict escalation effect of transnational ethnic ties will be intensified.

H2: High levels of discrimination against the ethnic kin in state B or the perception by State A that such grievances exist will lead to higher levels of dyadic conflict.

Mobilization

High levels of ethnic mobilization in State B provide allied elites in state A with better opportunities to realize the goal of similar policies across the two states. We further contend that state A's expectation that state B (that is, the state with the disenfranchised group) will engage in scapegoating behavior in an effort to mobilize its supporters against both the dyadic partner and the ethnic group will be likely to contribute to conflict behavior (i.e., state B will blame state A for meddling in state B's internal affairs and stirring up trouble).

H3: High levels of ethnic mobilization in state B will be associated with high levels of dyadic conflict.

RESEARCH APPROACH, MODEL DEVELOPMENT, AND OPERATIONALIZATION

In an attempt to understand the impact of ethnicity on international relations, we examine the influence of ethnic ties on the behavior of each state in the international system in 1977–1978 in dyadic interactions with each member of the state's PRIE (Maoz 1997). Through the use of the COPDAB (Azar 1980) events dataset, we employ a broad conceptualization of our dependent variable *international interactions* and include measures of the complete range of state interactions. We examine three components of international interactions. *Conflict* includes events ranging from minor verbal displays of discord to threats, to the

imposition of political and economic sanctions, and full-scale militarized hostilities. *Cooperation* includes events ranging from meetings of officials and verbal statements of support, to military and economic agreements, establishing joint military commands, and jointly fighting a war. Cooperation is neither the absence nor the opposite of conflict but a separate indicator that measures a different type of state behavior. Both of these components are also incorporated in the broader measure of *net interactions*, which represents the overall flow of relations from a state to its dyadic partner.

In the COPDAB dataset, events are coded on a fifteen-point scale with categories one through seven measuring cooperation and nine through fifteen measuring conflict. In order to create indices of cooperation, we assign weights to cooperative events according to their intensity and then sum the weighted values across a temporal unit — in this case the year — to create aggregate scores (see Azar and Sloan 1975 for a discussion of the intensity weights). This aggregate score is then divided by the number of events to create a measure of the average level of cooperation sent by an actor to its dyadic partner in a given year. Indices of conflict are created in the same manner for events in COPDAB categories nine through fifteen. Net interactions is a measure of the difference between the average level of cooperation and the average level of conflict. Positive values indicate that the relationship is generally cooperative; negative values indicate a conflictual relationship.

Our primary independent variables measure three facets of ethnicity: *ethnic alliance*, *minority mobilization*, and *minority discrimination/grievances*. An ethnic alliance is said to exist in cases where an advantaged minority lives in one state and members of the same minority group are at risk in the other state; an advantaged minority is a group that has access to the existing power structure. Minority mobilization is a measure of the extent of political organization and activity by the minority in the target state. Minority discrimination/grievances is a measure of the extent of discrimination of the minority group in the target state. Data measuring each of these variables was taken from Phase I of Gurr's (1993) *Minorities at Risk* dataset. The unit of analysis in the Gurr dataset is the minority group. The authors created the measure of ethnic alliance by "translating" Gurr's measures of the existence and status of the minority group into the PRIE dyads. To aggregate the data from the group level to the dyadic level for grievances and discrimination, we aggregated both measures at the level of the state by taking the highest group score on each variable. The amount of violent and nonviolent protest of the minority group during the 1975–1979 time period was summed into a measure of total protest mobilization.

Our study examines the interactions of each state in the international system with all other states within its PRIE in 1977–1978. Unfortunately, 1977–1978 is the last time period that COPDAB covers. PRIE was developed by Maoz and "represents the set of political units whose structure, behavior and policies have a direct impact on the focal state's political and strategic calculus" (1997). A state's PRIE contains all other states with which it is geographically contiguous and all major and regional powers that are capable of interacting militarily with the focal state. Our unit of analysis is state behavior toward a PRIE dyadic partner in

1977–1978. Employing the PRIE method of case selection allows us to avoid inflating our sample with implausible pairs. However, we have also coded contiguity for each state because of the salience of transnational movements of people across borders.

Davis, Jagers, and Moore (1997) show that the ethnic composition of states has an impact on dyadic conflict behavior, but their analysis fails to control for potentially relevant variables, and their findings may thus be spurious. To address that shortcoming, we construct a multivariate statistical model that enables us to control for the influence of potentially confounding factors, and we include a number of important control variables that influence international interactions. In particular, we find substantial evidence in the scholarly literature which suggests that strategies of reciprocity, joint democracy (that is, a dyad composed of two democratic states), the level of state development, economic growth, and power capabilities have a strong impact on dyadic foreign policy behavior. As a result, we include measures of these factors in our model.

Recent work on international cooperation and conflict—particularly among rival states—has focused on reciprocity (Ward 1982; Dixon 1986; Goldstein and Freeman 1990; Rajmaira and Ward 1990; Goldstein 1991; Goldstein and Freeman 1991; Ward and Rajmaira 1992). Results indicate that states tend to respond to the actions of others in kind. We expect that the behavior received by an actor from its dyadic partner will influence the state's behavior toward its counterpart; for all types of activities a strong positive relationship should exist between behavior received and behavior sent. Consequently we include a measure of the behavior of the target state toward the actor as an explanatory variable in each equation.

We adopt the same operationalization of regime type employed by Maoz and Russett (1993) for the measure of democracy. Maoz and Russett (1993) develop their indicator of regime type from the Polity II dataset (Gurr, Jagers, and Moore 1989) by subtracting a state's autocracy score from its democracy score and multiplying this quantity by the state's power concentration score. From this continuous measure, we create a dummy variable representing joint democracy for all dyads in which both states have regime type scores greater than thirty.

It has been argued that more developed states behave differently toward other actors in the international system. Cooperation, for instance, may be heavily influenced by the wealth of a state actor. Wealthy states are generally more extensively integrated into the international system. They have numerous transnational ties and involvements. They also tend to be more satisfied with the system (see for instance Organski and Kugler 1980; Lemke 1995). We generally expect more developed actors to exhibit more cooperative international behavior. A second, related argument posits that economic well-being has an important influence on the foreign policy behavior of states. Russett (1990) posits that states experiencing economic decline are far more likely to engage in foreign policy belligerence. Therefore, we include measures of the level of development and economic growth in our model. Data measuring the level of development were collected from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (various years). For each

state we calculate national income per capita as a percentage of the U.S. per capita national income for each year. States with per capita incomes of at least 30 percent of the U.S. per capita income in the given year are coded as developed. Data measuring the growth rate of GNP were collected from the International Monetary Fund's *International financial statistics* (various years).

Another potentially influential factor in determining the character of certain dyadic interactions are the relative capabilities of the states involved. We, like Bremer (1993), control for the difference between the capabilities of the actor and the capabilities of the target. Many hypothesize that particular power distributions are violence prone (for a detailed discussion of the debate see Sullivan 1990; Waltz 1979; and Organski and Kugler 1980). The value of the capabilities score for each state was constructed in accordance with Bremer (1993) and reflects the percentage of the total systemic capabilities controlled by each state in the given year.

Because we want to be able to determine whether the hypothesized relationships hold for aggregate foreign policy behavior, conflictual foreign policy behavior, and cooperative foreign policy behavior, or only for a subset of the three, we estimated the parameters for each of the following three equations:

$$NS = a + b_1 * NR + b_2 * EA + b_3 * MG + b_4 * MM + b_5 * DD + b_6 * EG + b_7 * LD + b_8 * C + b_9 * PD + e \quad [1]$$

$$CNS = a + b_1 * CNR + b_2 * EA + b_3 * MG + b_4 * MM + b_5 * DD + b_6 * EG + b_7 * LD + b_8 * C + b_9 * PD + e \quad [2]$$

$$CPS = a + b_1 * CPR + b_2 * EA + b_3 * MG + b_4 * MM + b_5 * DD + b_6 * EG + b_7 * LD + b_8 * C + b_9 * PD + e \quad [3]$$

Where:

- NS = Net behavior sent by the actor to the other member of the dyad
- NR = Net behavior received by the actor from the other member of the dyad
- CNS = Conflict sent by the actor to the other member of the dyad
- CNR = Conflict received by the actor from the other member of the dyad
- CPS = Cooperation sent by the actor to the other member of the dyad
- CPR = Cooperation received by the actor from the other member of the dyad
- EA = Ethnic alliance
- MG = Minority grievances
- MM = Minority mobilization
- DD = Joint democracy dummy
- EG = Economic growth
- C = Contiguity
- LD = Level of development
- PD = Power differential between actor and target

Below we present the results of the estimation of equations 1 through 3 in Tables 4.1 through 4.3, respectively. The same set of independent variables are included in each equation. All three equations were estimated using an ordinary least squares technique. We tested for collinearity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation to ensure that the assumptions of the ordinary least squares model were met. Because of the volume of output from the auxiliary R^2 tests for

collinearity and Goldfeld-Quandt tests for heteroskedasticity, we merely report that no auxiliary R^2 value exceeded .35, and the Goldfeld-Quandt F-statistics for each independent variable were insignificant, indicating variances were homoskedastic. The Durbin-Watson statistics for autocorrelation are reported in each table. All test statistics indicate that the OLS estimator is appropriate.

Results

The results from the regression analyses are presented in Tables 4.1 through 4.3. Regression analysis enables one to determine the impact of each variable on the dyadic foreign policy of what might be described as a typical dyad. The major objectives of our regression analyses are first to determine whether the given variable has a statistically significant impact on dyadic foreign policy behavior (that is, whether we can reject the hypothesis that the variable does not affect dyadic foreign policy behavior), and second, when the variable is found to have a statistically significant impact, to determine the direction of the impact (that is, whether positive changes in the variables increase or decrease the amount of dyadic foreign policy behavior). To reiterate our hypotheses about the impact of ethnic alliances and the status of minorities on international interactions, we expect that the existence of an ethnic alliance will be positively related to the occurrence of conflict and negatively related to net interactions and cooperation. We also expect that if the minority group is mobilized or discriminated against, the parameters measuring these two facets of the status of the minority group will also be positively related to conflict and negatively related to net interactions and cooperation.

The results in Table 4.1 support the contention that dyads with shared ethnic groups experience less cooperative overall relationships: the parameter for ethnic alliances is statistically significant at the .01 level and exhibits the expected negative sign. However, the parameters for mobilization and discrimination of the minority group are not statistically significant, indicating that the treatment of the minority group has little impact on overall relations. Two control variables are significant—net interactions received from the target state and joint democracy—indicating that relationships are reciprocal and that democratic dyads exhibit significantly more cooperative relations than other dyads. The overall fit of the equation is reasonable, with R^2 equal to .36.

When we separate foreign policy behavior and examine only cooperation (see Table 4.2), the ethnic alliance parameter is in the expected direction, but is not statistically significant. Hence, although ethnic alliances affect overall relations, they do not have a perceptible impact on cooperation. Neither of the minority status variables is significant either, indicating that the manner in which the minority group is treated has little impact on the levels of cooperation within the dyad. Two control variables are significant—cooperation received and contiguity, indicating that bordering states cooperate more and that reciprocity is a strong norm. Thus, although we find support for our three hypotheses when we examined net foreign policy behavior, when we disaggregate foreign policy behavior and exam-

TABLE 4.1
Ethnic Alliances and Net Interactions

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Estimated Parameter	Standard Error
Net interactions sent	Net interactions received	0.570 ^a	0.022
	Ethnic alliance	-3.607 ^a	1.089
	Minority grievances	0.032	0.049
	Minority mobilization	-0.208	0.119
	Democratic dyad	2.004 ^b	0.081
	Economic growth	0.088	0.050
	Level of development	0.704	0.735
	Contiguity	1.014	0.570
	Power differential	0.005	0.004
	(constant)	1.117	0.583

^a $p < .01$; ^b $p < .05$; Adj. $R^2 = .36$; $N = 1,328$

ine only cooperative activity, we fail to find support for the hypotheses. The implication is that although the ethnic composition of the states that compose a dyad influences their overall foreign policy behavior, it has no impact on cooperative foreign policy behavior.

Table 4.3 presents the results of the estimation of equation 3. These results provide additional support for the contention that the ethnic attributes of dyads influence patterns of conflict. The parameter for ethnic alliance is significant at the .01 level and indicates that states with shared ethnic groups exhibit considerably more conflict than other states (that is, the sign is positive, as expected). Further, the parameter for minority mobilization is also significant and positive, indicating that if the minority group is mobilized in pursuit of political ends, the relationship between the two states is considerably more conflictual. Three control variables are significant. The positive parameter for conflict received once again indicates support for the arguments about the reciprocal nature of interna-

TABLE 4.2
Ethnic Alliances and Cooperation

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Estimated Parameter	Standard Error
Cooperation sent	Cooperation received	0.685 ^a	0.001
	Ethnic alliance	-0.047	0.719
	Minority grievances	-0.023	0.032
	Minority mobilization	-0.509	0.708
	Democratic dyad	0.956	0.534
	Economic growth	0.001	0.001
	Level of development	0.557	0.487
	Contiguity	1.309 ^a	0.384
	Power differential	0.005	0.004
	(constant)	1.768 ^a	0.396

^a $p < .01$; Adj. $R^2 = .52$; $N = 1,328$

TABLE 4.3
Ethnic Alliances and Conflict

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	Estimated Parameter	Standard Error
Cooperation sent	Cooperation received	0.475 ^a	0.002
	Ethnic alliance	2.993 ^a	1.852
	Minority grievances	-0.053	0.039
	Minority mobilization	0.296 ^a	0.094
	Democratic dyad	-0.819	0.630
	Economic growth	-0.962 ^b	0.039
	Level of development	0.147	0.575
	Contiguity	0.949 ^b	0.447
	Power differential	-0.002	0.003
	(constant)	1.438 ^a	0.453

^a $p < .01$; ^b $p < .05$; Adj. $R^2 = .25$; $N = 1,328$

tional relations. The parameter measuring the impact of economic growth is also significant. The sign of this parameter indicates that states experiencing low or negative levels of economic growth are more likely to be involved in conflictual relationships. This finding supports the contention of Russett (1990). Finally, contiguity has a significant impact on conflict, supporting the findings of Bremer (1993) among others.

Taken as a group, what do these results indicate? First, we find support for two of the three hypotheses. Ethnic alliances lead to greater dyadic hostility, especially when the disadvantaged group is politically mobilized. On the other hand, we fail to find support for our second hypothesis, which suggests that the extent to which the disadvantaged group experiences relative deprivation increases dyadic tensions. Second, we demonstrate that although cooperative activity is not affected by ethnic alliances, conflictual behavior is higher in dyads with ethnic alliances. Finally, and most importantly, we demonstrate that these relationships hold when theoretically important control variables are included in the analyses: the impact of ethnic alliances is not spurious.

CONCLUSIONS

By way of conclusion we wish to consider the implications for the major theoretical approaches in international relations of our findings that the ethnic composition of states has an impact upon foreign policy behavior. Much of the theorizing to date in international relations has concentrated, for good reason, on the causes of war. In addition, the literature has devoted considerable attention to the behavior of the so-called "great powers" and the occurrence of war among them. Although the argument made by scholars that war among the major powers has determined the structure of the international system may be valid (for a discussion of the importance of this issue see Rasler and Thompson 1994; Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1988; or Organski 1968), this has had the unintended consequence of

leaving international relations theory with a relatively limited conceptual framework for addressing the relationship between ethnicity and international behavior. Although the two schools of thought, realism and liberalism, that have emerged as the dominant theories for explaining international relations do not explicitly address the influence of ethnicity on international conflict, it is possible to consider implicit linkages from within their respective frameworks.

Realism

The traditional realist paradigm (see Morgenthau 1948) and its more systematic neorealist version (as developed by Waltz 1959, 1979) argues that behavior (specifically making war) in the international environment is primarily driven by the structure of the system. Unitary states are the principal actors, and they exist in an international system characterized by anarchy. There is little difference between states: they are all driven by the same goal—self-preservation—the maintenance of which is accomplished by developing a preponderance of power over others or, at a minimum, preventing other states from gaining a preponderance of power. There are two primary means for achieving this goal—military buildups and alliance formation. However, an individual state's attempts at increasing its security through arms buildups or the forging of new alliances are likely to be perceived as threatening by its neighbors. As a result, all states face security dilemmas: if they increase their capabilities in order to improve their security situation, other states are likely to feel threatened and do the same.

Because security concerns dominate the hierarchy of interests of all states, other types of interactions among states, including economic, social, environmental, and cultural ties, are far less important. Further, cooperation is simply a tool states use to pursue lesser interests or to support self-preservation via the maintenance of economic competitiveness. Within this perspective, sub-systemic factors are deemed to be far less important than systemic constraints in the drive for national security. Particular characteristics or attributes of states, such as ethnic divisions, should have little impact on the behavior of states unless they influence self-preservation.

Although realist scholars are generally silent on the issue of ethnicity, the following linkage between ethnicity and international conflict patterns is implied by the realist perspective: since one tool for improving a state's security situation is to increase its relative capabilities, ethnic divisions within other states could provide states with opportunities to weaken potential rivals by exploiting their ethnic vulnerabilities. One could further argue that an ethnic minority that is mobilized and actively pursuing greater autonomy or separatist goals in a rival state represents a vulnerability, but an ethnic group that is assimilated into the society or incorporated into the political and/or economic structure of the state does not. Naturally, efforts to "destabilize" a rival state could take the form of covert or overt support of the ethnic minority. However, it might also take the form of increased foreign policy belligerence (with or without the direct support of the ethnic group).

Liberalism

Liberal arguments about the international system differ from those of the realists on four major counts (for a comprehensive overview see Haas 1964; Keohane and Nye 1977; Krasner 1978; and Keohane 1984). First, within the liberal perspective, states are not the only important actors in the international system. International organizations, multinational corporations, ethnic and religious groups, and other transnational movements of people can directly and indirectly influence international relations (Krasner 1978; Keohane and Nye 1977). In particular, international institutions can constrain and condition state behavior, often by helping to overcome the insecurity associated with the anarchic nature of the international system. Second, liberals contend that states are more usefully conceptualized as being composed of a variety of actors, who often have competing interests, and all of whom attempt to influence the formation of policies (e.g., Allison 1971; Jervis 1976). States can have a difficult time determining exactly what is in the national interest as different intergovernmental and interest groups attempt to manipulate information and influence policy to further their particular goals or the goals of their constituencies. Third, because of the difficulty of clearly defining goals, state decisions are often determined through bargaining, coalition building, and clashes among the various components of government. Individually rational behavior may result in collectively irrational decisions as groups pursue their individual interests at the expense of national interests. Finally, other issues beside national security concerns are often pursued by the state. Social, economic, political, cultural, and ecological agendas are often the focus of state behavior.

Building on this set of assumptions, liberal theorists have argued that the international system has the potential to move beyond the cycles of warfare that have characterized international relations since the Peace of Westphalia. In particular, increasing economic interdependence, the spread of democratic governments, and the growth of institutions have all contributed to the evolution of the international system. Economic interdependence is said to constrain states from employing violence in the international system because of the threat warfare poses to the increasing gains from trade (Rosecrance 1986; Nye 1988). In addition, the discovery of a lack of hostilities between democratic states leads liberal scholars to argue that the democratization of the international system has important implications for the occurrence of war (Doyle 1986; Chan 1984; Maoz and Russett 1993). Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that a system made up of only democratic states would be free of war (Rummel 1979). Finally, as international institutions increase in number and grow in importance, liberal theorists have pointed to their influence in conflict management and the manner in which they constrain state behavior (Keohane 1990).

What, then, does the liberal approach imply about linkages between the ethnic composition of states and dyadic foreign policy conflict? We submit that liberalism identifies one set of factors that could conceivably increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict affecting international relations, and another set of factors that

might diminish the likelihood of an international dimension to ethnic conflict. To address the first set, the fact that the state is not conceptualized as a unitary actor leads one to expect that the interests of particular groups are more likely to become the focus of state behavior. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that certain states might pay attention to the demands of domestic ethnic groups or other interest groups to act on behalf of ethnic brethren in other states. A second factor identified by liberalism is international norms. Hence, concern about the treatment of ethnic groups could lead states to become belligerent toward a rival. In the same vein, states may be willing to participate in efforts by international institutions and/or nongovernmental organizations aimed at overcoming ethnic discrimination or oppression.

On the other hand, liberalism also points to factors that would limit the influence of ethnicity on dyadic foreign policy behavior. In particular, international institutions are likely to constrain the willingness of states to take direct action, in favor of allowing the institution to attempt to manage or resolve the situation, especially if a state contains an ethnic minority of its own. Second, the growth of democratic regimes, which tend to be more inclusive of groups within their societies, may limit the appeal of ethno-nationalist aspirations and separatist movements. Finally, liberalism suggests that increasing economic interdependence should constrain states from risky foreign policies.

With respect to the major theoretical frameworks in international relations, our findings have a number of important implications. Most significantly, our results indicate that the ethnic characteristics of states have an influence on foreign policy behavior. This finding presents difficulties for realist theories that neglect state-level characteristics, and adds further impetus for expanding the scope of liberal theories that focus on the characteristics of states. In many ways, these findings point to the importance of further critical thinking and reconceptualizing. Having discovered empirical evidence to support the contention that ethnicity matters, we find ourselves in a situation not unlike that characterizing international relations during the last ten years, in which scholars have found themselves attempting post hoc to develop theories to explain the newly realized democratic peace. Developing better theories for understanding the dynamics and processes through which ethnicity influences international interactions is important.