

Ethnic Minorities and Foreign Policy

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To what extent do ethnic minority groups influence foreign policy? This question hinges on the impact of cross-border ties between ethnic groups and the extent to which a minority ethnic group can “capture” foreign policy despite opposition from the majority in both democratic and autocratic regimes. The evidence suggests that ethnicity matters, but in a limited fashion: ethnic ties can heighten diplomatic conflict, influence decisions to provide support for insurgent groups, and exacerbate international crises. Yet these ties have little impact on decisions by governments to impose economic sanctions and are far from the primary determinant of international armed conflict. Ethnicity is but one cleavage over which political mobilization might occur, and one that neither scholars nor politicians should reify.

One way to understand contemporary violent conflicts throughout the world is through the lens of ethnic conflict. Many Western intellectuals and media outlets have adopted this as the dominant perspective in explaining recent and ongoing violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Indonesia, Sudan, and between Israel and Palestine.¹ Yet their discussions have largely ignored a potentially important impact of ethnic politics on contemporary world affairs: the influence of ethnic groups on the foreign policy of democratic governments. Such influence raises a number of interesting and compelling questions. For example, if ethnic politics are a primary cause of violence, as is generally presumed, is the world more violent because of the impact of ethnic groups on foreign policy? Further, are minority

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groups able to “capture” foreign policy (i.e., control policy toward a foreign nation such that the result is contrary to the policy preferences of the majority), and thereby undermine democratic principles of representation?

Is the world more violent because of the impact of ethnic groups on foreign policy?

In this essay, I explore the extent to which ethnic groups affect foreign policy. It is useful to begin with a brief discussion of how to define ethnicity and then consider the extent to which ethnic groups affect foreign policy—both as the victims of violence and its perpetrators. In the end, ethnic politics are what we make of them and

that both intellectuals and policymakers would do well to avoid reifying “ethnic conflict.”

Conceptualizing Ethnicity

I define ethnicity broadly to include cultural, linguistic, racial, and religious boundaries. An ethnic group distinguishes itself from others, or is distinguished by them, through their inclusion into one or more of these boundaries. An individual can belong to an ethnic group via self-identification, by being treated as such by nongroup members, or both. We are most interested in groups that satisfy both criteria, as these groups are considerably more likely to be politically active.²

Conceptions of ethnicity differ radically between the “constructivist” and the “primordial” school. Consider the following two caricatures: constructivists believe in a marketplace of “identities” where ethnic “entrepreneurs” (i.e., aspiring leaders) compete with class entrepreneurs, ideological entrepreneurs, vocational entrepreneurs, and others to gain the allegiance of potential group members. In other words, individuals choose identities in the marketplace, “constructing” one from among those available in society. According to constructivism, ethnic identities are ephemeral and subject to manipulation by leaders.

The primordialist school, on the other hand, posits that ethnic identities are ascribed characteristics—they are fixed at birth. An individual is born into a lineage that confers group membership. There is no “choice” involved. Since ethnic identities are fixed, only group fertility and mortality account for their waxing and waning.

While no scholar holds these extreme positions, most align themselves closer to one than the other. Most people, however,

hold several identities, each of which can be more or less important depending on circumstances. Although the emphasis on choice is overdone in the above caricature, most people do exercise some degree of flexibility. The extent to which this is true, however, is a function of both socio-economic status (which is neither independent from, nor strictly determined by, the identity of one's parents) and the freedom of the society in which the individual lives.

Both constructivist and primordial perspectives can explain ethnic politics: leaders who seek influence—whether through political office, religious posts, or other positions of power in society—have an incentive to mobilize support among group members. According to the constructivist view, there are people, “entrepreneurs,” whose task it is to construct and maintain identities. By the primordialist account, there are communities in need of leadership, which in turn provide incentives to compete for leadership positions. Either perspective can explain the presence of ethnic politics. However, only the constructivist approach can explain both the amazing variety in ethnic political mobilization within countries—but especially across countries—as well as violent conflict. Put differently, a constructivist approach better fits the facts.³

This implication is important: ethnic politics, like *all* politics, are driven by mobilization (i.e., the ability of leaders to create followers). There is nothing automatic about ethnic mobilization. Those who fail to appreciate this reality increase the risk not only of provoking overreaction but also of encouraging reification. In other words, we tend to foster ethnic mobilization by defining people as “the other,” and thus aid ethnic entrepreneurs in their efforts to galvanize a particular group.

Ethnic Minorities and Other Countries' Foreign Policy

Having conceptualized ethnicity, let us consider the principle mechanism by which ethnic politics can affect international politics, namely, “ethnic ties” across borders. An ethnic tie exists whenever members of an ethnic group are split across a border and members of the group form either a dominant majority or an advantaged minority in one of the two countries. For example, Hindus form a dominant majority in India and a minority in Pakistan. Therefore, a Hindu ethnic tie exists across the India-Pakistan border.

Studies show that ethnic ties increase foreign policy conflict, especially between bordering countries. More specifically, one set

of studies shows that the country in which the group is dominant or advantaged is more hostile toward the country where the group's kin are disadvantaged or persecuted.⁴ Interestingly, the

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other country's foreign policy does not appear to be affected by the ethnic tie. Nor do ethnic ties dampen the efforts on the part of either country to achieve cooperative agreements with the other (e.g., bilateral negotiations, trade agreements, alliance formation, etc.). The only systematic effect of the ethnic tie appears to be a more bellicose

foreign policy by the country where the group members are dominant or advantaged toward the country where the group members are disadvantaged.⁵

Another set of studies has shown that ethnic ties are the most important factor determining levels of international support for a given minority group.⁶ Countries that have minority groups within their borders do not hesitate to support their ethnic kin across the border—in other words, countries do not cooperate with one another to minimize the risk of secession each faces. A recently published list of state supporters of insurgent groups during the 1990s provides further material for exploring this issue.⁷ Throughout the decade, forty-four insurgencies benefited from foreign state support, and in seventeen of those cases, the fate of coethnics or coreligionists was one of the factors motivating this support. Regional influence, on the other hand, was listed as a motivation in all but one of those cases. When this information is combined with the study of ethnic ties, we observe not only that ethnic ties facilitate international political support, but also that state support for insurgencies is primarily driven by geopolitics.

Given the role ethnic ties play in conflict behavior, one could ask whether the status of the disadvantaged group affects the importance of ethnic ties. Indeed, some groups, though victimized, have not yet mobilized politically. For example, consider African-Americans in the United States prior to the civil rights movement, the Roma throughout Europe, ethnic Koreans in Japan, or ethnic Hungarians in Romania.⁸ While no ethnic ties exist in the first two cases, such ties characterize the latter two: the minorities in Japan and Romania are majorities in Korea and Hungary, respectively. Further, Japan and Korea share a water border and Romania and

Table 1: Irredentist Claims during the 1990s

Irredentist Claim	Maker of Claim	Current Sovereignty
Aegean Sea Islands	Greece, Turkey	Turkey, Greece
Arunachal Pradesh	China	India
Baluchistan	Iran, Afghanistan	Pakistan
Belize	Guatemala	Belize
Bosnia Herzegovina	Croatia, Yugoslavia	Bosnia Herzegovina
Cyprus	Greece, Turkey	Cyprus
Diego Garcia	Mauritius	U.K.
Djibouti	Somalia	Djibouti
Falklands/Malvinas	Argentina	U.K.
Gibraltar	Spain	U.K.
Hatay	Syria	Turkey
Israel	Palestine, Syria	Israel
Kashmir	Pakistan	India
Kurile Islands	Japan	Russia
Kuwait	Iraq	Kuwait
Moldova	Romania, Russia	Moldova
Northern Island	Ireland	U.K.
North Ossetia	Ingushetia	Russia
North West Frontier Province	Afghanistan	Pakistan
Sabah	Philippines	Malaysia
South Tyrol	Austria	Italy
Taiwan	China	Taiwan
Transylvania	Hungary	Romania
Ukraine	Russia	Ukraine
Uzbekistan	Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan	Uzbekistan

Source: Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly, *Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2000), Table 2.1 (part 2), 63.

Hungary share a land border. In the two cases where no ethnic tie exists, the impact on the foreign policy of other countries was limited. One can think of low-level diplomatic pressure exerted on behalf of such minority groups: Soviet criticisms of the treatment of African-Americans; U.S. Department of State reports on the status of the Roma in Europe. Beyond such symbolic gestures, however, I am hard-pressed to name cases where a country's foreign policy was influenced by the victimization of a group that was not mobilized. As such, it seems reasonable to conclude that victimized groups that have not mobilized are unlikely to have an effect on international politics. Instead, they are likely to suffer quietly, attracting the intermittent attention of human rights groups, select journalists, and perhaps government reports with negligible influence on policy.

So we would expect that if victimized groups that are not mobilized were going to influence a second country's foreign policy, it would be in those countries where an ethnic tie exists. Continuing with our two examples, North Korea and Hungary have both clashed with Japan and Romania, respectively, over the treatment of Koreans and Hungarians. These observations are consistent with the ethnic tie argument. However, neither North Korea nor Hungary has been willing to invoke sanctions or military force to press its claims. There seems to be a pattern beyond our illustrative cases: countries appear unwilling to invoke punitive measures in support of victimized groups, even in the presence of an ethnic tie.⁹

Perhaps a group must fight on its own before other countries are willing to join it with more than symbolic support or diplomatic pressure. Investigating this argument, Moore and Davis report that the level of group mobilization does *not* have an influence on the level of foreign policy conflict when an ethnic tie is present. Given that their work shows that ethnic ties are in fact important, this suggests that a group need not mobilize to receive the support of kith and kin.

Yet consider the potentially contradictory example of South Africa, where far-reaching economic sanctions were used to support a highly mobilized ethnic majority. Ethnic ties certainly do not explain this case, as sanctions were primarily imposed by countries without them. Perhaps the majority status of the victimized group, coupled with the level of mobilization, help explain such international action. However, the passing of the colonial era has greatly reduced the number of cases of majority victimization.

Another possibility is that international reaction occurs when the level of victimization is critical.

Having mentioned sanctions, we should briefly consider whether ethnic ties influence them. The answer is no. Only one of the fifty-three cases of economic sanctions imposed between 1975 and 1990 occurred as a result of ethnic ties.¹⁰ This suggests that ethnic ties influence low-level diplomatic conflict as well as support for insurgency, but not economic sanctions. What about military intervention? Studies of military intervention in civil wars have found that the probability of intervention is primarily driven by the level of violence: only when violence crosses a high threshold are countries likely to intervene.¹¹ Unfortunately, no measure of ethnic ties are included in these studies, so whether ethnicity plays a role in military intervention is still unknown. However, they do suggest that only gross levels of victimization are likely to elicit a military intervention. The contemporary flagship example is NATO's response to conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.¹²

Certainly this argument explains peacekeeping missions by NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the UN in East Timor. Nevertheless, the Rwandan case serves as a stark reminder that our model explains only the *probability* of intervention. Did ethnic ties play a role in these cases? Apparently not. While ethnic ties could explain the participation of some countries in peacekeeping efforts, citing ethnic ties as a major causal factor is more of a stretch. This observation is also consistent with the Davis and Moore study cited above, which reported that while an ethnic tie tended to engender a more belligerent foreign policy, such belligerence was limited to diplomacy and did not include sanctions or war.

A number of studies on the impact of ethnicity on interstate conflict also exist. This research shows that ethnic ties tend to result in longer interstate crises, which end in more ambiguous outcomes and attract greater attention from outside powers.¹³ The available evidence suggests the following role for ethnic ties in international politics: they increase conflict in diplomatic interactions; they influence the extent to which a country will support insurgent groups; and they exacerbate international crises. However, ethnic ties do not prompt economic sanctions and are far from the primary determinant of conflict behavior, including state support for insurgencies. Finally, we know little about the impact of ethnic ties on military intervention in civil wars, an activity that is certainly more costly than support of insurgents abroad and therefore less likely to be undertaken.

Policy Capture in Democracies

Foreign policy is rarely a critical election issue in democracies and is therefore more susceptible to capture, as majorities rule at the polls while minority interest groups tend to influence policies not contested in national elections.¹⁴ The *prima facie* case for the United States is its policy toward Cuba.¹⁵ Although opinion polls suggest that U.S. citizens favor a normalization of relations with Cuba, Washington continues to maintain sanctions initially imposed in the 1960s. The first generation of the Cuban diaspora supports this policy, and it is not a major issue in national elections: candidates know that U.S. voters will not withhold their votes over support for economic sanctions to Cuba. They also know that first-generation Cuban voters will tend to withhold support for candidates that refuse to endorse the sanctions. Thus, candidates for national office can gain Cuban votes by supporting sanctions without fear of losing votes from other groups. As a result, a small minority has managed to capture an aspect of U.S. foreign policy.

The Cuban example raises three questions worth investigating. First, is this a widespread phenomenon? Second, does it undermine democracy? And third, are autocratic forms of government also susceptible to ethnic policy capture, or is policy capture limited to democracies?

How Widespread?

We have little systematic research to rely on in answering these questions. Nevertheless, we can search for patterns in selected cases. While examples of foreign policy capture other than the U.S.-Cuban case certainly exist, developing a comprehensive list of cases where countries have seen their foreign policy hijacked by mobilized ethnic minorities is more difficult. Ethnic majorities—as explained by the ethnic ties argument—are another matter. For example, in both the Korean and Hungarian cases mentioned above, the homeland's foreign policy has been influenced by ethnic ties.

Nevertheless, the “capture” of foreign policy by majorities is less of a concern to most observers, primarily because it does not imply an undermining of democracy—a topic I will address below. However, supporters of the national interest as the *sine qua non* of foreign policy will blanch at the notion that ethnic ties affect foreign policy (except in cases where the support of an irredentist claim can be cast as being in the national interest). A review of re-

cent and contemporary irredentist claims shows that at least half of such claims—eighteen of thirty-two—are motivated by ethnic ties.¹⁶

Somalia's ill-fated claim on the Ogaden region in Ethiopia is a prime example of how ethnic ties can lead to interstate violence. After its independence in the 1960s, Somalia sought to create a greater Somaliland by uniting all territories where Somalis resided, including the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Following a military coup in 1977, the Somali armed forces invaded Ogaden to wrest it from Ethiopian control, but were defeated. Since territorial claims are the most potent source of interstate violence, it is not surprising that the most likely forms of ethnic conflict to generate interstate violence are territorial disputes based on ethnic reunification.

To return to the comparison of minority versus majority "capture" of foreign policy, irredentist claims are exclusively a product of "majority," not "minority" capture, as a perusal of any list of such claims clearly shows. This should serve as some solace for alarmists tempted to overdramatize the "threat" that ethnic minorities pose to foreign policy.

Undermining Democracy

Is democracy more at risk from ethnic minorities capable of capturing foreign policy or from ethnic majorities responding to ethnic ties? Madison's *Federalist No. 10* suggests institutional designs can protect against the tyranny of factions.¹⁸ Yet, as noted in the U.S.-Cuban example, Madison's celebrated remedy to the tyranny of the minority—popular suffrage—is

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undermined when a given issue is not one of the few salient points over which national elections are contested.

Despite the risk that minorities can capture foreign policy, the review of the evidence above produces little to suggest that this risk manifests itself in practice. Ethnic ties impact foreign policy and international politics in certain ways, but there is little evidence that minority groups are specifically to blame. Indeed, the issue of minority blame has been less well explored than ethnic ties

in general: scholars have yet to separate the minority–minority ties from majority–minority ties.¹⁹ My review of the various lists of cases, however, leads to the conclusion that not only are majority–minority ties considerably more prevalent than minority–minority ties, but majority–minority ties are also more likely to impact foreign policy. And this should not be surprising, since minorities are generally not advantaged in the political arena.

The Basque case illustrates this point. A minority in both France and Spain, the Basques have failed to capture control of foreign policy in either country to influence policymaking in the other. While this case was specially selected to prove my point, the point itself remains: although the Basque issue has never achieved salience in French national elections, Basques in France have failed to capture French policy toward Spain as Cuban-Americans have captured U.S. policy toward Cuba. The reader can, of course, point out a large number of differences between these two cases that explain the different outcomes. My point is simply that the U.S. case appears to be the exception, not the rule.

Are Autocratic Governments Susceptible to Policy Capture?

Asking whether autocratic governments are susceptible to policy capture might strike some readers as odd. After all, autocratic or authoritarian rulers do not answer to the people. Yet we should

not dismiss this question so quickly. Authoritarian rulers are far from absolute sovereigns—like their democratic counterparts, they are beholden to constituencies. The relevant constituency may be limited to fellow members of the Politburo, the top level of party functionaries, generals, the officer corps, and landed

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elites. But, unlike their democratic counterparts, autocratic rulers are often removed from power by force, and their removal is sometimes brutal, terminating more than their political career. The question, then, is whether the constituency to which a given authoritarian ruler is beholden is likely to be an ethnic minority or, perhaps, an ethnic majority.

To explore this question further, it will be useful to briefly compare the incentives of autocratic and democratic leaders. Re-

cent research suggests that political leaders of democratic governments will provide policies that better represent the interests of all people than will the leaders of autocratic or authoritarian regimes, primarily because these leaders are responsible to a larger group of people. Democratic regimes generally spend more on public health and education than autocratic regimes, and have greater success in war than autocratic regimes while at the same time avoiding war with other democracies.²⁰ This implies neither that democracies will always avoid minority capture of foreign policy nor that they will always avoid the influence of ethnic ties. Nevertheless, holding the distribution of ethnic minorities with foreign policy goals and ethnic ties constant, it does imply that democratic regimes will be less susceptible to these forces than autocratic regimes. Whether an autocratic regime is susceptible to minority capture depends on whether that group is an important constituency.

The important point to appreciate is that autocratic governments are susceptible to minority capture. More specifically, the degree of susceptibility across autocratic governments will vary more than among democratic governments. These conclusions are rather different than what conventional wisdom would predict.

That said, the empirical evidence here mirrors what I found for democratic regimes. Not surprisingly, both autocratic and democratic regimes have responded to ethnic ties. Further, among the regimes that have made a transition from autocracy to democracy, some have continued to produce policies consistent with ethnic ties, while many others (e.g., the former Soviet Union) find themselves with new cross-border ethnic ties as a result of new borders. However, as noted above with respect to democracies, majority-minority ties are easier to find than minority-minority ties.

Final Thoughts

Do ethnic identification and mobilization across ethnic cleavages threaten both democracy and peace? Many observers believe they do. Samuel Huntington's famous *Clash of Civilizations* foresees a struggle between the West and Islam. Western coverage of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa frequently borders on racist interpretations of tribalism. And conflicts throughout the former communist countries and Asia are generally understood as the product of ancient hatreds between ethnic groups. In this discourse, only the OECD countries and Latin America appear civilized: save immigra-

tion, they are spared from the scourge of ethnic politics and the violence it brings. I reject this discourse in favor of a different view that understands ethnic politics as an unexceptional type of politics much as any other.

To be clear: ethnic politics matter. But the rather limited claims made here are far from the dramatic, fear-inspiring claims frequently uttered on this topic. We would do well to remember

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the following fact: interethnic cooperation is the rule; interethnic violence is the exception.²¹ Yet, unfortunately, the “if-it-bleeds-it-leads” rule governing the news media often holds in intellectual circles and policy discussions as well.

As a result, our image of ethnic politics is one of strife and violence, not one of nonviolent competition and cooperation, despite the fact that the latter model characterizes the overwhelming majority of interethnic interaction on our planet, whether local, national, or international.

And this observation, then, leads to my key point: ethnic politics are what we collectively make of them. Governments victimize communities of people across many categories, and ethnic identification is, alas, one of them. Ethnicity has proven itself a useful cleavage along which to gain political office in both autocratic and democratic regimes, and there is no reason to expect conditions to change in the near future: John Lennon’s “Imagine” has yet to take root in the minds of humankind. One consequence of these two facts is that ethnic ties influence foreign policy and international politics. The evidence reviewed here shows that the influence appears restricted to diplomatic pressure and (largely covert) support of insurgents, although some evidence suggests effects on international crises.

How should these conclusions inform policymakers? A politician that has reached office by mobilizing support along an ethnic cleavage will, in the absence of a new constituency, need to pursue policies that continue to appeal to that ethnic cleavage. Given the incentives ethnic entrepreneurs have in bedeviling the “other,” leaders of countries free from relevant ethnic cleavages would do well to support those looking to demobilize such cleavages, presumably in favor of other fault lines in society. At a mini-

mum, policymakers should avoid reification of ethnic cleavages: ethnic politics are not the only politics possible. To accept them as such misses the more obvious rivals of income and wealth.

Mobilization, not ethnic mobilization, is ubiquitous. Ethnicity is but one cleavage over which it might occur. Further, nonviolent competition and cooperation are the norm across mobilized groups. Violence is certainly prevalent, but our understanding of violence must be informed by an understanding of both nonviolent competition and cooperation. If our explanations cannot account for both, and the unequal frequencies of each, they are poor explanations. Contrast the arguments offered here to those raised by ethnic alarmists and those who reify ethnic mobilization with references to ancient hatreds. Can they account for the nonviolent competition and cooperation we observe on our planet, or only for the violence?

Yes, ethnicity matters in international politics, but to identify ethnic mobilization as the major threat to peaceful competition and cooperation not only fails as an explanation, it runs the risk of self-fulfillment. Empirical evidence shows that the foreign policy of democracies is not undermined by ethnic mobilization, despite the risk that it could be. Nor is the foreign policy of autocratic countries undermined. International politics does bear the footprints of ethnic mobilization, but they are relatively small tracks, and certainly not the heavy tread many would have us believe.

Notes

¹ For an example, see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

² See, for example, Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1994).

³ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 90 (1996): 715-735; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," *International Organization* 54 (2000): 845-877.

⁴ David R. Davis and Will H. Moore, "Ethnicity Matters," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1997): 171-184; David R. Davis, Keith Jagers, and Will H. Moore, "Ethnicity, Minorities and International Conflict," in *Wars in the Midst of Peace*, eds. David Carment and Patrick James (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1997), 148-163; Will H. Moore and David R. Davis, "Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy," in *Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict*, eds. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 89-103.

⁵ Hungary's diplomatic belligerence toward Romania is an example.

⁶ Stephen M. Saideman, *The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy & International Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), and Stephen M. Saideman, “Discrimination in International Relations,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39 (2001): 27–50.

⁷ Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

⁸ Both the Koreans in Japan and the Roma in Hungary and the Czech Republic have begun to mobilize in the past several years, but few would characterize either group as being effectively mobilized.

⁹ The influence of African-American legislators on U.S. policy toward South Africa is an exception.

¹⁰ I use the list of sanctions reported in Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 2d ed. (Washington DC: International Institute of Economics, 1991).

¹¹ Patrick M. Regan, *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

¹² V.P. Gagnon, Jr., “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia,” *International Security* 19 (1994–95): 130–166. Gagnon provides an excellent discussion of this case from a similar perspective. David Carment and Frank P. Harvey, *Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000). Carment and Harvey provide a useful discussion of NATO’s intervention in these conflicts.

¹³ David Carment, “The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory,” *Journal of Peace Research* 30 (1993): 137–150; David Carment and Patrick James, “Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39 (1995): 82–109; Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “The Ethnic Dimension of International Crises,” in *Wars in the Midst of Peace*, 164–193.

¹⁴ Ole R. Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

¹⁵ Some argue that U.S. policy toward Israel is also an example of minority capture. While the Jewish-American minority has certainly created a strong lobby in Washington, public opinion has historically supported U.S. policy toward Israel. Since majority opinion has not been at odds with national policy, this is not an example of what I call policy capture. If majority public opinion breaks with policies advocated by the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States but U.S. policy does not change, then we can speak of foreign policy capture by an ethnic minority.

¹⁶ See Table 2.1 in Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly, *Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension*, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 2002), 63.

¹⁷ John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Paul R. Hensel, “Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816–1992,” *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (2001): 81–109.

¹⁸ It is important to note that although Madison was discussing the Constitution of the United States, his point applies to all democracies, not just the United States.

¹⁹ A minority–minority tie exists when members of an ethnic group are a minority in two countries (e.g., Basques in France and Spain). A majority–minority tie exists when members of an ethnic group are in the majority in one country and the minority in another (e.g., Hungarians in Hungary and Romania).

²⁰ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair A. Smith, “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999): 791–807; David A. Lake and Matthew A. Baum, “The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and The Provision of Public Services,” *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (2001): 587–621. Amartya Sen first noted this tendency with respect to food security in the 1970s.

²¹ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review* 90 (1996): 715–735.